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Abstract: Abstract: In the modern world of finance, understanding the drivers of asset value is crucial.
This thesis is divided into three research articles that covers various aspects of this issue. The first paper
estimates the pricing kernel from equity data. The pricing kernel is an essential tool to price a given
random stream of payment, for example, a stock. While standard economic theory suggests a decreasing
pricing kernel; empirical literature on the other hand often finds a U-shaped one. The main contribution
of this paper to the existing literature is the systematic testing of the increasing parts for statistical
significance, and the finding that the increases are not statistically significant. Even if not significant,
the U-shaped pricing kernels are found in various datasets and in different time periods, thus indicating
the existence of increasing parts in the kernel. It is also found that the U-shape can be obtained by
estimating the kernel with various functional forms, thereby ruling out the role of the specificity of the
pricing kernel functional form. The second paper develops a model to analyze the impact of financial
constraints on the value and investment behavior of a firm. The model explains many puzzling effects
found in empirical literature such as the highgrowth, high-risk nature of small firms, pro-cyclical invest-
ment behavior, the leverage effect and the higher average returns of value stocks. The last paper uses
simulations to show that in the long run, a strategy based on the fundamental value of an asset (more
specifically, the expected discounted value of dividend payments) is better than many other potentially
irrational investment strategies, and that this is particularly true when firms can default and dividends
are nonstationary. This finding extends the existing literature on evolutionary finance. Zusammenfas-
sung: In modernen Finanzmärkten ist es wichtig zu verstehen, wie der Wert eines Wertpapiers bestimmt
wird. Diese Dissertation behandelt dieses Thema in drei Teilen. Der erste Teil schätzt den Pricing Kernel
mit Hilfe von Aktiendaten. Mit dem Pricing Kernel kann der Wert eines zufälligen Zahlungsstroms, z.B.
einer Aktie, bestimmt werden. Gemäss den üblichen ökonomischen Annahmen muss der Kernel fallend
sein; empirische Schätzungen finden jedoch häufig U-förmige Teile im Pricing Kernel. Im Wesentlichen
zeigt dieser Teil, dass die steigenden Teile im Kernel nicht statistisch signifikant sind. Jedoch kann die U-
Form in verschiedenen Datensätzen und Zeitperioden gefunden werden. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass der
Kernel trotzdem steigende Teile enthalten kann. Gestützt wird dies durch die Tatsache, dass die U-Form
bestehen bleibt, auch wenn unterschiedliche funktionale Formen für den Kernel verwendet werden. Der
zweite Teil entwickelt und analysiert, was mit dem Wert und den Investitionen einer Firma geschieht,
wenn diese keinen Zugriff auf externe Finanzierung hat. Es stellt sich heraus, dass verschiedene Puzzles
aus der empirischen Literatur, wie das hohe Wachstum und Risiko kleiner Firmen, das pro-zyklische In-
vestitionsverhalten, der Leverage Effekt oder die höhere Durchschnittsrendite von Value Aktien, dadurch
erklärt werden können. Der letzte Teil simuliert Investitionsstrategien. Dabei wird aufgezeigt, dass
sich eine Strategie, welche auf Basis der Fundamentalwerte der Firmen (der Summe der erwarteten,
abdiskontierten Dividendenzahlungen) investiert, eine bessere langfristige Performance erzielt als andere
potentiell irrationale Strategien. Dies gilt im Besonderen auch dann, wenn die Dividenden nicht stationär
sind und Firmen Bankrott gehen können. Letzteres trägt zur Erweiterung der bestehenden Literatur in
Evolutionary Finance bei.
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Introduction
The concept of absence of arbitrage is a cornerstone of modern -
nance. It implies that nancial gain cannot be derived from nothing
or in simpler terms, an asset with higher expected returns is riskier.
The no-arbitrage condition implies the existence of a pricing kernel
that precisely reects the pricing information of all assets. From the
stipulation, it follows that the price of an asset is equal to its pric-
ing kernel-weighted payos. In fact, the realizations of the pricing
kernel vary in response to economic situations such as a recession or
a boom. Typically, during a recession, when the value of money is
higher, the pricing kernel has a higher value than during a boom.
Classical nance theories such as the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) equate good and bad economic conditions with high and
low equity market returns respectively. This, in turn, implies that
the pricing kernel is declining in market returns. However, estima-
tions of higher-order moments in CAPM models on equity returns
show that the pricing kernel is U-shaped; see Dittmar (2002), Pot
(2006) and Post et al. (2008), that is, it increases with positive re-
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turns. This nding thus contradicts the classical nance theory.
The rst article mainly investigates whether the upward slope in
the U-shaped pricing kernel is merely a statistical artifact. To de-
termine this, dierent functional forms of the pricing kernel are esti-
mated on the basis of the generalized method of moments (GMM).
The estimated polynomial pricing kernel for three of the ve datasets
is U-shaped with a clear increasing region. In these three datasets,
the observed average asset returns are better explained by the U-
shaped pricing kernels. This shape is robust for dierent time win-
dows. Instead of polynomials, estimating the kernels with other func-
tional forms that do not exclude a U-shape by construction also yields
a U-shaped kernel. However, because the upward slopes are not sta-
tistically signicant, these ndings may not succeed in persuading
advocates of standard economic theory to change their viewpoints.
In the rst article, asset returns are assumed to be exogenous. In
reality, though, assets are never wholly intangible; they are backed
by real companies that grow and evolve with time. Empirical evi-
dence shows that rm characteristics change throughout the various
phases of evolution that is, they follow a life cycle. Young rms are
more prone to risk. They encounter greater challenges in gaining ac-
cess to credit markets and therefore often reinvest their earnings. At
the same time, they place greater emphasis on innovation and have
a faster growth curve. Large companies, however, tend to be risk-
averse, less exible, and slower in growth. However, because of their
slower pace of growth, they have free cash ows to pay out as divi-
dends. The second article captures these observations and presents
them in a simple life cycle model. The following assumptions gener-
ate the described life cycle features in the model: decreasing marginal
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productivity, that is, an inverse relationship between rm capital and
productivity, relative to the rm size; over proportional negative ex-
ogenous random shocks to small rms; and lack of access to external
nance sources. Overproportional shocks to small rms result in a
complex relationship between rm size, expected return and volatil-
ity. With larger rms, a so-called leverage eect can be observed: a
drop in the value of a company increases the volatility of the returns
of it. With small and medium-sized rms, a value eect is observed:
on an average, companies with high book values yield higher returns
because the high book value helps absorb the negative shocks. Nat-
urally, the higher chance of survival also makes companies with more
capital more valuable. With the help of business cycles, the life cycle
model also explains IPO waves, procyclical investment behavior, and
countercyclical default probabilities.
The second article also explores whether intervention by a central
bank can help the small constrained rms. Findings reveal that in
the absence of access to external nance, an interest rate policy intro-
duced by the central bank oers little assistance. The interest rate
policy has negligible impact on the buer against negative shocks
that constrained rms attempt to build by saving a considerable
part of the capital. Consequently, the investment behavior remains
unchanged. The only remedial measure for these constrained com-
panies is acquiring access to the credit markets. However, agency
conicts are one of the main reasons that prevent many companies
from securing sucient credit, and in most cases, they cannot be
easily resolved through regulations.
The last article employs the dividend process from the second
article in an evolutionary market model. In this model, several in-
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vestment strategies start with a sum of initial wealth and compete
against each other. The study aims to identify the strategy that
can not only survive but also outperform the other strategies in the
market. The model assumes three dividend-based stages of life cy-
cles. IPOs are essentially newly founded rms that pay no dividends.
They evolve into startups, which are small rms, in the subsequent
period and pay a few dividends. Startups face a higher risk of de-
fault but also stand to grow into a concern. Concerns, on the other
hand, pay out large dividends and face a low default risk. Every eco-
nomic period witnesses the birth of new IPOs and defaults. Dierent
investment strategies compete in an evolutionary market with these
three types of assets. High-performing strategies naturally gain more
wealth shares than low-performing ones. The success of a strategy
depends not only on its ability to predict the dividends, which follow
a life cycle, but also on the other strategies in the market.
A surviving strategy for innitely lived assets is a generalized
Kelly rule, a strategy that maximizes the long-term growth of wealth.
Simulation results from the third article, which also discusses non-
innitely lived assets following life cycles, are in agreement with this
nding. A novel nding of this article is that strategies that predict
the dividend process of a rm on the basis of those of other similar
rms perform better and gain more wealth shares. Because events
such as defaults occur once in the lifetime of a rm, past realization
of the dividends of that rm reveal almost nothing about a default.
Lack of sucient data history for predicting the dividend process
can lead to a situation wherein simplistic strategies perform better
than an estimated generalized Kelly rule. Given that a default is a
rare event, it takes considerably long for the generalized Kelly rule
BIBLIOGRAPHY ix
to dominate the market.
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Article 1
Is the Pricing Kernel
U-Shaped?
Abstract: There is strong empirical evidence that the pricing kernel is U-
shaped, which provides a way to explain the substantial coskewness premium.
Existing studies typically use a polynomial approximation of the pricing kernel.
Problematically, these polynomials have, in most cases, increasing parts by con-
struction. Therefore, it is not clear whether the increasing parts are an artifact
of the chosen functional form. Taking this concept into consideration, this paper
shows that pricing kernels, as estimated by the generalized method of moments
on equity data, are still U-shaped and that the increasing part is not a statis-
tical artifact. This conclusion derives from the fact that the functional form of
kernels, which allows for strictly decreasing kernels as well as for kernels with
increasing parts, is still U-shaped. These results arise from checking for higher
order polynomials, various time horizons, and dierent functional forms of the
kernel.
1-1
1-2 ARTICLE 1. IS THE PRICING KERNEL U-SHAPED?
1.1 Introduction
In the absence of arbitrage, a pricing kernel exists such that the price
of an asset is equal to its pricing kernel-weighted payos. However,
the no-arbitrage condition provides no information about the shape
of the kernel (besides that of non-negativity). In equilibrium models
with complete markets and a risk-averse representative agent who
knows the probabilities of all states of the world, the pricing kernel
is high in states with low resources because the marginal utility of
one unit of additional consumption is high. However, in states with
many resources, the pricing kernel is low. Therefore, the pricing
kernel should decrease with resources.1 In contradiction, there is,
as shown in the following paragraphs, empirical evidence that the
kernel is U-shaped within a certain range. However, studies such as
those from Dittmar (2002), Pot (2006), and Post et al. (2008) do
not investigate whether these increasing parts are signicant. This
paper tries to ll this gap.
Empirical evidence for increasing parts in the pricing kernel can
be found in equity as well in option data. Estimating the kernel
with equity returns yields a U-shaped pricing kernel, as Dittmar
(2002), Pot (2006), and Post et al. (2008) have shown by approxi-
mating the kernel with a quadratic function or a higher order poly-
nomial. The reason underlying this shape is the coskewness of single
assets with the market portfolio returns (as a proxy for the avail-
able resources), such that the three-moment extension of the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) provides a signicant risk premium
1Suitable textbook references are Magill and Quinzii (1996) or Cochrane
(2001).
1.1. INTRODUCTION 1-3
for coskewness (Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Friend and Wester-
eld (1980), Barone-Adesi (1985), Lim (1989), Harvey and Siddique
(2000), Errunza and Sy (2005) and Smith (2007)). However, Dittmar
(2002) and Post et al. (2008) show that the observed coskewness pre-
mium can no longer be explained if nonsatiation, risk aversion, and
nonincreasing absolute risk aversion are imposed on the utility func-
tion of the representative agent (thereby translating into restrictions
on the pricing kernel). Furthermore, Pot and Wang (2010) showed
that unconstrained quadratic or higher order kernels imply relative
risk aversions of above ve for the representative investor, which is
generally considered to be implausible. The pricing kernel in the
well-known CAPM, discussed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and
Mossin (1966), is linear in relation to market returns, whereas the
three-moment CAPM extends this with a quadratic term. On ex-
tending the CAPM by further moments, Fang and Lai (1997) and
Hung (2008) found that co-kurtosis is also a relevant pricing factor.
Considering a third order polynomial for the pricing, it still remains
U-shaped in market returns, as shown by Dittmar (2002). Estima-
tions of the kernel from equity data clearly point to a U-shaped
kernel.
Pricing kernel estimations done with option data also show a U-
shaped kernel around the current stock price. Prominent examples
of this are At-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Jackwerth (2000), and Rosen-
berg and Engle (2002). Note that estimating pricing kernels with
option data allows us to estimate the pricing kernel within a broader
range of market portfolio returns than is the case for equity data.
The reason for this is that options exist with quite extreme strike
prices, whereas such extreme values can rarely be observed in mar-
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kets. Therefore, it turns out that pricing kernels typically fall after
an increasing part of the kernel. If the view is restricted to the range
of the kernel, which can be estimated by equity data, the kernel es-
timated by option data has a U-shape. More recent evidence is less
clear: Detlefsen et al. (2007) estimated the kernel for German data
at several points in time; in some cases, he derived a U-shape around
the actual index level, and sometimes the kernel was merely decreas-
ing. In another work, Golubev et al. (2008) provide some evidence
that the increasing parts of kernels estimated using option prices
are statistically signicant. However, by using an asymmetric GJR-
GARCH model with empirical innovations for option data, Barone-
Adesi et al. (2008) and Barone-Adesi and Dall'O (2010) showed that
the increasing parts of the kernel largely disappear.
In conclusion, there is empirical evidence for U-shaped kernels
from equity as well as from option data around the current market
price. Given that the estimations with equity data typically employ
polynomial kernels and particularly quadratic kernels, the pricing
kernel, by construction, has to be U-shaped (an inverse U-shape is
also conceivable). This leads to the question as to whether the in-
creasing part of the pricing kernel is merely a consequence of the
polynomial functional form. Another interesting question is whether
many observations of market returns are present in the increasing
part. If not, then the increasing part could be a meaningless arti-
fact. Unfortunately, the existing literature is not particularly helpful
in addressing these concerns. For instance, Dittmar (2002), Pot
(2006) and Post et al. (2008) estimated kernels with increasing parts
and found that the coecients before the polynomial terms were sig-
nicant. However, their studies did not locate the minimum of the
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kernel or the origin of the increasing part of the kernel. Further, they
do not provide any information on how often the economy lies in the
increasing part of the kernel. Other studies, such as Hansen and
Singleton (1982, 1983), and many subsequent works, have chosen a
functional form (typically a power utility) such that the pricing ker-
nel declines with any parameterization. More recently, Post and van
Vliet (2006) and De Giorgi and Post (2008) estimated pricing kernels
based on second-order stochastic dominance|and by that, assuming
decreasing kernels|and found that the pricing kernels are steep in
losses and at in gains. However, this approach is also unhelpful
in answering the question whether the pricing kernel is U-shaped.
However, restricting kernels to be decreasing would result in such
at parts of the kernel.
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to check whether the pric-
ing kernel has increasing parts and, if so, where these are. The main
contributions of this paper are as follows: First, it makes clear that
the increasing parts of the kernel are not an artifact of the polyno-
mial functional forms by estimating the kernel for functional forms,
where the kernel may be U-shaped or where it is not (i.e., the piece-
wise linear kernel and the modied quadratic kernel, which starts at
one point to be linear). These various functional forms, furthermore,
allow direct testing for the increasing parts in the kernels. Second,
estimating a higher order polynomial kernel than the literature re-
veals also that the dataset, including the Fama-French value, size,
and momentum portfolios, has a clearly U-shaped kernel, which was
not the case with a quadratic kernel.
Following a large part of the previously cited literature, the kernel
is estimated on equity data by the generalized method of moments
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(GMM). Following Post et al. (2008), the pricing kernel is assumed
to be constant over time. There are two main reasons for this: First,
the question to be answered in this paper is if the pricing kernel is
persistently U-shaped. Therefore, even if the pricing kernel is time
varying, the focus is on the shape of the kernel as an average over the
long run. In line with that is the usage of equity data, because the
available data history is much longer for them than for option data.
Second, theory does not show how the time variation of the ker-
nel should be modeled. Taking, for example, the equilibrium model
provided later in this paper, the pricing kernel depends only on the
preferences of the representative agent. Given that the preferences
remain roughly constant over time, the pricing kernel is also. Fur-
thermore, it is reasonable to choose a simple econometric model,
which is capable of modeling the main features but is only slightly
misspecied, rather than a complicated one, where one cannot be
certain that it is even more misspecied. Concerning the results
of the estimations, the quadratic kernel turns out be U-shaped, in
line with Dittmar (2002), Pot (2006) and Post et al. (2008). Each
of them estimates the kernel on one dataset. To ensure robustness
of the results, this paper estimates everything using ve dierent
datasets. Additionally, this paper quanties the eect of the in-
creasing parts of the kernel further: For two of these datasets, the
kernel lies in the increasing region for more than one-quarter of the
total observed period. In the other three datasets, the kernel lies in
the increasing part for less than 2.5% of the observed periods. These
results demonstrate two things: the pricing kernel is U-shaped, but
the number of observations, when an increasing kernel occurs, may
vary substantially.
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An obvious issue with a polynomial kernel, especially a quadratic
kernel, is that it almost automatically has increasing parts in it.
Therefore, it is interesting to see how well a kernel does that is re-
stricted to be decreasing. For example, Post et al. (2008) restricted
the parameters of the kernel in such a way that on all observed data,
the kernel is falling. With such an approach, the parameters may
be strongly restricted: in my dataset the observed market returns
range from -0.29 to 0.384, but 95% of the market returns are ob-
served between -0.105 and 0.1. If a falling kernel is enforced in too
large a range, the parameters of the whole kernel in that setup are
massively more restricted. This becomes problematic if, as shown,
only 5% of the observations can be found on approximately one-half
of the restricted range.
A further step for investigating the shape of the kernel is to re-
strict the slope of the kernel to zero in increasing areas (as in Dittmar
(2002)). Since the kernels with the restricted and the unrestricted
slope are not in this way nested in each other, it is noteworthy that
the nonincreasing kernel ts the data worse than the kernel with the
increasing parts. However, this eect is less strong than in Dittmar
(2002). Setting the slope of the increasing parts to zero is one pos-
sible way, but might it be better to restrict the slope to be smaller
than another level, for example  0:01? An innovation of this paper
is to estimate the level where the slope of the kernel should be re-
stricted: it turns out that this level, in four out of ve datasets, is
(insignicantly) positive. That is, even if the functional form of the
kernel explicitly allows for the increasing parts of the kernel to be
at, the estimation shows increasing parts.
A potential issue is the order of the polynomial; the literature, for
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example Dittmar (2002) and Pot (2006), stops with pricing kernels
of order 3. This paper tests polynomials up to order 7. In four out
of our ve datasets, this is enough. However, in the fth dataset,
the Fama-French value, size, and momentum portfolios, a pricing
kernel with a polynomial of at least order 6 with a clear U-shape
is appropriate. Chung et al. (2006) and Nguyen and Puri (2009)
showed that Fama-French value, size, and momentum excess returns
can be explained by a higher-order polynomial of the market excess
return; the resulting pricing kernel is, therefore, a consequence of
this. Because a polynomial of order 3 is sucient, if the momentum
portfolios are not included, it can be concluded that this eect can
be attributed to the momentum portfolios.
Finally, a polynomial may not be the correct functional form
of the pricing kernel. To check this, a piecewise linear kernel is
estimated. It turns out that the estimated piecewise linear pricing
kernel has approximately the same shape as the polynomial kernel,
including its increasing parts.
Overall, this paper shows, with an extremely broad range of dif-
ferent tests, that the pricing kernels have a U-shape and that this
shape is neither the result of a misspecied functional form nor a
statistical artifact. Nonetheless, one word of caution: the estimation
of the kernel cannot be done very precisely. The observed substantial
variation between the kernels estimated from the dierent datasets
and the poor signicance of most statistical tests demonstrate this.
Nonetheless, estimations on ve dierent datasets and over a time
horizon of more than 80 years point to a U-shape for the kernel.
Hence one can be condent that the increasing parts of the kernel
exist and that they, therefore, should be taken into account for asset
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pricing.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 1.2
provides the model framework and section 1.3 the estimation method-
ology. Section 1.4 describes the datasets, and the pricing kernels are
estimated and tested in section 1.5. The eects of these kernels on
the utility function of a rational, representative investor are shown
in section 1.6. Finally, section 1.7 presents the conclusions.
1.2 Model framework
No arbitrage implies the existence of some risk-neutral measure ,
such that for all assets k, the expected return under  is the risk-free
rate Rf (Harrison and Kreps (1979))|that is,
Rf = E(Rk) for all assets k:
Let ps denote the physical probability of state s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg. Then,
Rf = E(Rk) =
SX
s=1
ps
s
ps
Rks =
SX
s=1
psLsR
k
s = EP (LRk); (1.1)
where Ls =
s
ps
is the pricing kernel.2 To keep notation simple, the
physical probability EP is, in the future, written as E. As Equation
(1.1) holds for any assets k and j, one has
0 = E
 
L  (Rk  Rj) ; (1.2)
2Often|for example, in Cochrane (2001)|the stochastic discount factor is
used instead of the pricing kernel. Both measures for the state prices dier in a
(multiplicative) constant.
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and furthermore, because  and p are probabilities and L  0,
E(L) = 1: (1.3)
No arbitrage implies these conditions for the pricing kernel. In-
stead of an unconditional expected value, a conditional expected
value|that is, 0 = E
 
L(Rk  Rj)j
t

, as in Dittmar (2002) and
Pot (2006), for example|can be used, where 
t is the information
available in period t. More precisely, 
t are the realizations of some
random variables in t, on which the conditional expected value is
dened. How the conditioning variables included in 
t should be
chosen is unclear. Cochrane (2001, p. 145) summarized the issue as
follows: \The situation is not repaired by simple inclusion of some
conditioning information. Models such as the CAPM imply a con-
ditional linear factor model with respect to investors' information
sets. However, the best we can hope to do is to test implications
conditioned down on variables that we can observe and include in
a test. Thus, a conditional linear factor model is not testable." A
possible way to circumvent this is to take the expected value of the
conditional expected value
0 = E
 
E
 
L  (Rk  Rj)j
t

= E
 
L  (Rk  Rj) :
That is, the conditional model implies the unconditional one if the
pricing kernel, L, is constant over time. Thus, it can be concluded
that the unconditional model must hold, in any case, in the long run.
While this method is probably not the most ecient way to estimate
a pricing kernel, it relies on only a few assumptions, and the results
cannot be inuenced by wrongly chosen conditional variables.
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1.2.1 Relation to the utility function of a repre-
sentative investor
No arbitrage implies the existence of a positive pricing kernel. To
obtain more information on the shape of the pricing kernel and on
which variables the kernel depends, an equilibrium model can be
used. Consider a two-period model in which a representative agent
has initial wealth w0 and an increasing, strictly concave, and dier-
entiable utility function. Then the representative agent maximizes
his utility:
max
k
u(c0) + E(u(C));
where  is the time discount. The maximization is done under the
following budget constraints:
C = w0
 
KX
k=1
kR
k +
 
1 
KX
k=1
k
!
R0
!
c0 = w0
 
1 
KX
k=1
k
!
;
where c0 is consumption in the rst period, as given by the initial
wealth minus the investment, into a portfolio of assets where k is
the portfolio weight of asset k 2 f1; : : : ;Kg, and Cs is consumption
in state s, given by the payos of the portfolio bought in the rst
period. Then the budget constraints are inserted into the maximiza-
tion problem. The rst-order conditions of the utility maximization
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problem then imply for all assets k
Rf = E


u0(C)
u0(c0)
Rk

:
A comparison with equation (1.1) immediately shows that the pricing
kernel is given by
L = 
u0(C)
u0(c0)
: (1.4)
In the previous model,  and c0 are constants. The likelihood ratio
process is, therefore, proportional to the marginal utility in the next
period. Further, it is falling in consumption because of the concave
utility function; that is, the increasing parts in the likelihood ratio
process cannot be explained by this model.
The estimated pricing kernel supports the model as long as the
pricing kernel is nonincreasing. However, empirical evidence shows
that there may be increasing parts in the pricing kernel (see, for
example, At-Sahalia and Lo (2000) for evidence from option data or
Dittmar (2002) for evidence based on equity data). In this situation,
any assumption of the model may be violated. For instance, Ziegler
(2007) identies problems of aggregation, misestimated beliefs of the
agents, Peso problems, and heterogeneous beliefs as possible reasons
for the observed increasing parts in the pricing kernel. However,
several examples and some empirical evidence show that none of
these explanations may suce to explain the observed increasing
parts of the kernel under a reasonable set of assumptions. Hens
and Reichlin (2010) show, furthermore, with simple examples that a
nonconcave utility function of the representative investor, incomplete
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markets, or heterogeneous beliefs may explain the increasing parts
in the kernel. In this setup, the latest solution seems to be the
best explanation since the other two possibilities need unrealistic
assumptions or the results are fragile if the parameters are changed
a bit. Over all, it is challenging to explain the increasing parts of
the kernel theoretically under plausible assumptions.
With the equilibrium argument above, the pricing kernel depends
on the consumption of the representative investor. This consumption
is typically approximated by the use of either aggregate consumption
or market portfolio return data. The latter source assumes that the
only source of income for an investor is his assets and that by mar-
ket clearing, the representative investor holds all assets in equilibrium
and, therefore, earns the market return. Mankiw and Shapiro (1986)
have shown that using market portfolio returns as a consumption
proxy explains the observed risk premia (in a CAPM setup) much
better than does using aggregated consumption. The main com-
petitor for market portfolio returns|namely, aggregate consump-
tion data from the National Income and Products Accounts, which
has been used by Hansen and Singleton (1982) and many others|
causes several problems. For example, Breeden et al. (1989), Fer-
son and Harvey (1992), Wilcox (1992), and Slesnick (1998) discuss
measurement errors, denitional problems, issues with seasonal ad-
justment, and other problems with the aggregation of the consump-
tion data over time. Furthermore, many behavioral explanations|
for example, narrow framing, loss aversion, or mental accounting|
demonstrate why wealth (or changes in it) should be included in the
utility function of the representative agent and also, therefore, in
the pricing kernel. St-Amour (2007) gives a short overview of this
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literature. For example, Barberis and Huang (2006) and Hens and
Wohrmann (2006) demonstrated that the equity premium puzzle
can be explained in that way. For these reasons, the pricing ker-
nel is chosen as a function of the market excess return: L(rm) with
rm = R
M  Rf . A side eect of this is that by subtracting the risk-
less rate, the kernel is in real terms. This makes sense because the
consumer is not interested in his nominal wealth but in the amount
of real consumption he can aord with his wealth. Nonetheless, the
impact of stochastic ination on portfolio decisions may be complex,
as demonstrated by Brennan and Xia (2002) in a continuous time
setup. The chosen approach tries, therefore, to keep the impact of
stochastic ination on our results as small as possible but does not
claim to solve this issue.
1.2.2 Functional form of the pricing kernel
To test for increasing parts, kernels that can, but do not have to,
contain increasing parts are especially interesting. In the following,
we consider linear, polynomial, and piecewise linear kernels. The
rst two types are important since they are used in a large part of
the literature. However, many polynomial, and especially quadratic,
kernels have the disadvantage that almost by denition they have
increasing parts. Because of that, the piecewise linear kernels are
also used.
In the CAPM, the pricing kernel is a linear function of market ex-
cess return. Rubinstein (1973) showed that the CAPM can be consid-
ered as a rst-order Taylor approximation of a representative investor
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with an arbitrary utility function. A higher-order Taylor approxima-
tion of the pricing kernel L = u0(C)=u0(c0) = u0(rm)=u0(c0) at the
risk-free rate (assuming that c0 is constant) has the following form:
L(rm) = h0 + h1u
00  rm + h2u000  r2m + h3u0000  r3m + : : :
The quadratic and cubic terms can be interpreted as preferences
for skewness and kurtosis. Typically, most people prefer positively
skewed distributions without fat tails; therefore, h2u
000 should be
positive, and h3u
0000 should be negative. The polynomial kernel is
dened as
L(rm) = 0 + 1  rm + 2  r2m + 3  r3m + : : : = 0 +
X
j
i  rjm:
(1.5)
This kernel has two advantages: it is extremely general (every con-
tinuous function can be approximated by it) and it can be written in
terms of linear factors, where rm; r
2
m; : : : are the factors. However,
is a polynomial the right type of function to approximate a pricing
kernel? By construction, a Taylor approximation describes a func-
tion well at the point of approximation, but worsens the further it
is away from that point. To estimate the pricing kernel for large or
small market returns, other functional forms could potentially work
better. An alternative is to use a piecewise linear kernel with break-
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points q1; : : : ; qn, i.e., as follows:
L(rm) = 0 + 1rm +
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 for rm < q1
2(rm   q1) for q1  rm < q2
2(rm   q1) + 3(rm   q2) for q2  rm < q3
...
...
2(rm   q1) + 3(rm   q2)+
: : :+ n+1(rm   qn) for qn  rm:
(1.6)
The main advantage of this functional form is the enormous num-
ber of possible shapes of the kernel. Post and van Vliet (2006) is
one of the few studies where a piecewise linear marginal utility func-
tion (i.e., in a representative agent model, a piecewise linear pricing
kernel) has been used. The authors mainly nd that the market
portfolio is not mean variance ecient but that third-order stochas-
tic dominance seems to hold for the market portfolio. Since they
are focusing on a linear program to check the stochastic dominance,
they focus on decreasing kernels. The main reason for the rare us-
age of the piecewise linear kernel may be that the rst derivative
in rm is not continuous in all points. For the generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimation, it is required only that the piece-
wise linear pricing kernel is dierentiable in all  , which is obviously
given. Nevertheless, for numerical optimization the noncontinuous
rst derivative of rm may be problematic. The estimation methods
are discussed in more detail in the next section.
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1.3 Estimation methods
In a further step, the pricing kernel must be estimated from data.
This can be done in various ways: Based on no-arbitrage, this step
is especially easy for a linear kernel, which can be determined out of
the market portfolio and the risk-free asset, and it is then identical
with the famous CAPM. If it is possible to represent the kernel in
a linear form in factors, then the kernel can be estimated via OLS
regressions. More complicated kernels may be estimated by GMM.
All these estimation methods are discussed in more detail in the
following sections.
1.3.1 Benchmark CAPM
The CAPM of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) as-
sumes a linear pricing kernel L = ~0+~1rm with market excess return
rm = R
M   Rf . This pricing kernel can easily be estimated out of
the return of the market portfolio and the riskless asset. Assuming
that asset k in equation (1.2) is the market portfolio and that asset
j is the risk-free rate, the following conditions are satised:
0 = E
 
L  (RM  Rf ) = ~0E(rm) + ~1E(r2m)
1 = E(L) = ~0 + ~1E(rm):
Solving this system of two linear equations for ~0 and ~1 results in
the following:
~0 =
E(r2m)
var(rm)
and ~1 =   E(rm)
var(rm)
: (1.7)
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Plugging in the average and variance of past market portfolio excess
returns is the simplest way to estimate the parameters of a linear
pricing kernel. The advantage of this method of estimating a pricing
kernel is that it depends only on the risk-free rate and the return of
the market portfolio. Therefore, it does not depend on the returns
of individual assets. This is an advantage, because it is typically
not feasible to include every single asset in the world in an empirical
study; therefore, the choice of the assets to include may aect the
results. For the rest of the paper, this estimation method for a pricing
kernel is referred to as the benchmark CAPM model. The following
two subsections describe two additional methods for estimating more
general pricing kernels.
1.3.2 Factor models
If pricing kernels are linear combinations of factors, they can be esti-
mated using linear factor models. The CAPM (or its higher moment
versions) or the Fama-French three-factor model are special cases of
factor models. Furthermore, all the functional forms of the previous
section can be rewritten in factor form. Since a large part of the
literature focuses on factor models and on the risk premia for the
dierent factors, it is helpful to illustrate their link with the pricing
kernel. Assume that the pricing kernel is given by L = b0 + b
0f ,
where f is a vector of factors that vary over time, and b0 and the
vector b are constants. Given E(L) = 1, this can be rewritten as
L = 1 + b0 (f   E(f)). Writing everything in terms of excess re-
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turns, Rek = R
k  Rf , Equation (1.2) becomes
0 = E
 
L  (Rk  Rf ) =: E (L Rek) :
With Re dened as the vector of excess returns of all assets, this is
equivalent to
0 = E (L Re) = E(Re) + b0 cov (f ;Re)
E(Re) =  b0 cov (f ;Re) =  b0 var(f) var(f) 1 cov(f ;Re)
= 0;
where
 =   var(f)b and  = var(f) 1 cov(f ;Re)
are the risk premium and risk exposure of every risk factor. The
CAPM is a special case of that model. If the CAPM pricing kernel
L = ~0 + ~1rm is plugged in, the expected excess return of an asset
in the CAPM is a risk premium, ~ = E(rm),3 times the CAPM-
. It measures the exposure to the market risk and is dened by
~ = cov(rm; R
e)= var(rm).
In general,  are the estimated multiple regression coecients of
excess returns Re on the demeaned factors f . This oers one way
to estimate  and : rst, regress Re on the demeaned factors f to
obtain the estimator ^. Second, regress the average excess returns
of the assets Re on ^ to obtain an estimator for the risk premium
^. Most of the extant literature stops at this point and estimates
3To obtain that, plug equation (1.7) into the denition of .
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the risk premia, k, of each factor. Because b =   var(f) 1, the
estimator for b is
b^ =  
0@ 1
T
TX
t=1
 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
! 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!01A 1 ^:
The estimated pricing kernel, L^, is obtained by plugging b^ into the
denition of the pricing kernel:
L^ = 1 + b^0
 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!
:
Appendix 1.8 shows that under weak assumptions (heteroskedastic-
ity is allowed), b^ is a consistent estimator of b. Through the consis-
tency of b^ and the law of large numbers, it directly follows that L^ is
consistent. While consistency alone does not provide any informa-
tion about condence intervals or the signicance of the parameters,
these can be obtained using GMM estimation.
1.3.3 Estimation via the generalized method of
moments
Compared to the factor model, GMM permits more general pric-
ing kernels and provides asymptotic test statistics for the estimated
parameters. Assuming that the pricing kernel is a function of the
market excess return rm, equations (1.2) and (1.3) imply the follow-
1.3. ESTIMATION METHODS 1-21
ing moment restrictions:
0 = E
 
L(rm)  (Rk  Rf )

0 = E (L(rm))  1:
The market portfolio also has to be priced correctly. Therefore,
0 = E (L(rm)  rm) =
X
k
E
 
L(rm)  !k(Rk  Rf )

;
where !k is the weight of asset k in the market portfolio in every
time period. Moreover, this condition ensures that the sum of the
pricing error over all assets is close to zero. Given these moment
conditions, the parameter of the pricing kernel can be estimated
using GMM. Note that no assumptions about the distribution of the
returns are required, only that all moments must exist. Additionally,
some regularity conditions should be satised.
Assume that Xt is a vector of the data needed to estimate the
model (mainly asset and market returns in t); then T is the vector
of the true parameter of the pricing kernel, and the vector of all
moment conditions is written as
0 = E(g(Xt;T )) := E
0BBBBB@
L(rm;T )  (R1  Rf )
...
L(rm;T )  (RK  Rf )P
k L(rm;T )  !k(Rk  Rf )
L(rm;T )  1
1CCCCCA :
The estimated parameter ^ is chosen such that the deviations from
the moment conditions are minimized (the deviations are weighted
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by a weighting matrix W ):
^(W ) = argmin ngn()
0Wgn()
gn() =
1
n
nX
t=1
g(Xt;):
Under some regularity conditions, the estimator ^(W ) is consistent,
and if W is a consistent estimator of the inverse covariance matrix
of g(Xt;), the estimator is asymptotically ecient. The dierence
between the estimator ^(W ) and the true parameter T is asymp-
totically normally distributed. This approach allows all kinds of
statistical tests, especially t-tests.
The minimization problem of the GMM estimator is solved nu-
merically. Therefore, accurate starting values are crucial. Because
the factor model presented before provides a consistent estimator of
the model parameters, I use them as starting values.
To obtain an estimation of W , the two-step GMM method in
Hansen (1982) is applied.4 Using this method, the model is rst es-
timated withW as the identity matrix and the parameter estimates
from the factor regression as starting values. Then a heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix for
g(Xt;) is calculated (see Newey and West (1987)). With the in-
verse of this covariance matrix serving as the weighting matrix W ,
the denitive model is estimated. Hansen et al. (1996) suggested
more sophisticated GMM estimators: the iterated GMM and con-
tinuously updated GMM estimator, which dier in the way they
4All estimations are done with R. For the GMM estimations, the GMM-
package of Chausse (2010) has been used.
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determine W . Newey and Smith (2004) and Anatolyev (2005) con-
cluded that the two-step and iterated estimators are asymptotically
equivalent and that the continuously updated estimator has a smaller
asymptotic second-order bias than the other two estimators. With
nite samples, these results can obviously dier. In this paper, the
two-step estimator is used because it turned out to be the numerically
most robust estimator. The iterated and continuously updated esti-
mator leads to extremely volatile pricing kernels. (Chapman (1997)
found similar problems with the iterated GMM estimator, in which
the observed average returns are far from the mean returns predicted
by the model.)
1.4 Data
The suggested estimation methods need the excess returns (i.e., Rk 
Rf ) of various assets and the market, and the market capitalizations
of all the assets as well. Monthly data are used, starting in 1926, from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University
of Chicago. The CRSP all-share index, a value-weighted index of all
common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets,
is taken as a proxy for the market portfolio. The risk-free rate is
the one-month T-Bill rate. To avoid spurious results, all kernels are
estimated using the monthly excess returns of ve dierent sets of
data. The rst two sets of assets are the 17 and 30 Fama-French
industry portfolios.5 They group all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
5Fama and French used data from CRSP to calculate their returns. Compu-
stat data are used for the portfolio weights of the value portfolios.
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17 Industry Portfolios
Industry N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
Food 1000 0.0069 0.049 -0.02 9.4 0.8 2.2 0.8 0.09 0.005
Mines 1000 0.0071 0.068 -0.12 5.3 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.07 0.028
Oil 1000 0.0078 0.061 0.29 7.0 0.9 3.1 0.9 0.01 0.843
Clths 1000 0.0057 0.062 0.33 8.2 0.9 2.5 0.8 0.17 0.000
Durbl 1000 0.0060 0.078 1.36 19.7 1.3 7.3 1.5 0.21 0.000
Chems 1000 0.0074 0.064 0.34 9.5 1.0 4.2 1.1 0.11 0.001
Cnsum 1000 0.0072 0.050 0.25 9.2 0.7 2.8 0.8 0.06 0.070
Cnstr 1000 0.0064 0.069 0.43 8.8 1.2 4.7 1.2 0.11 0.001
Steel 1000 0.0065 0.086 1.37 16.7 1.4 9.1 1.6 0.11 0.000
FabPr 1000 0.0060 0.061 0.15 9.1 1.0 3.6 1.0 0.10 0.001
Machn 1000 0.0078 0.072 0.18 8.6 1.2 4.6 1.2 0.11 0.000
Cars 1000 0.0078 0.079 1.15 16.7 1.2 6.7 1.5 0.15 0.000
Trans 1000 0.0063 0.072 1.01 15.2 1.2 6.1 1.3 0.15 0.000
Utils 1000 0.0056 0.057 0.13 10.5 0.8 2.8 0.9 0.11 0.000
Rtail 1000 0.0068 0.060 -0.01 8.1 0.9 2.7 1.0 0.14 0.000
Finan 1000 0.0071 0.070 0.56 14.3 1.2 5.1 1.3 0.17 0.000
Other 1000 0.0056 0.052 -0.19 6.8 0.9 1.8 0.8 0.12 0.000
Market 1000 0.0000 0.000 0.00 11.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.00 0.000
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of the monthly excess returns (i.e.
Rk   Rf ) of the 17 industry portfolios and the market portfolio:
average; standard deviations; skewness; kurtosis; CAPM-; , the
exposure to the skewness risk (see equation 1.8); , the exposure to
the kurtosis risk (see equation 1.9) and the rst-order autocorrelation
coecient (with p-value) of portfolio excess returns.
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30 Industry Portfolios
Industry N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
Food 1000 0.0070 0.049 0.06 9.4 0.8 2.3 0.8 0.08 0.007
Beer 1000 0.0090 0.075 1.84 25.2 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.09 0.005
Smoke 1000 0.0080 0.059 0.07 6.4 0.6 2.4 0.7 0.07 0.035
Games 1000 0.0080 0.091 0.64 12.3 1.4 6.3 1.6 0.19 0.000
Books 1000 0.0060 0.071 0.52 9.7 1.1 5.0 1.2 0.18 0.000
Hshld 1000 0.0060 0.061 0.37 15.5 0.9 3.7 1.1 0.08 0.008
Clths 1000 0.0060 0.061 0.30 7.9 0.8 1.9 0.6 0.15 0.000
Hlth 1000 0.0080 0.058 0.18 10.1 0.9 3.4 0.9 0.07 0.018
Chems 1000 0.0070 0.064 0.37 9.7 1.0 4.3 1.1 0.10 0.001
Txtls 1000 0.0060 0.081 1.05 12.6 1.2 6.3 1.3 0.18 0.000
Cnstr 1000 0.0060 0.070 0.36 8.9 1.2 4.3 1.1 0.13 0.000
Steel 1000 0.0060 0.085 1.37 16.7 1.4 9.1 1.6 0.11 0.000
FabPr 1000 0.0070 0.073 0.48 10.4 1.2 5.4 1.3 0.13 0.000
ElcEq 1000 0.0090 0.078 0.60 11.6 1.3 6.1 1.4 0.10 0.001
Autos 1000 0.0080 0.081 1.23 17.4 1.2 6.9 1.5 0.15 0.000
Carry 1000 0.0080 0.078 0.49 8.4 1.2 5.0 1.2 0.11 0.001
Mines 1000 0.0070 0.073 0.13 6.7 0.9 3.1 1.0 0.05 0.108
Coal 1000 0.0100 0.092 0.87 9.8 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.04 0.217
Oil 1000 0.0080 0.061 0.29 7.0 0.9 3.1 0.9 0.01 0.829
Util 1000 0.0060 0.057 0.13 10.5 0.8 2.8 0.9 0.11 0.000
Telcm 1000 0.0050 0.046 0.00 6.2 0.7 1.2 0.6 0.09 0.007
Servs 1000 0.0090 0.086 1.11 19.2 0.8 -1.6 0.4 0.03 0.361
BusEq 1000 0.0080 0.069 -0.22 6.1 1.1 2.1 0.9 0.09 0.005
Paper 1000 0.0070 0.061 0.36 9.5 1.0 3.9 1.0 0.06 0.071
Trans 1000 0.0060 0.073 1.10 16.0 1.1 6.3 1.3 0.15 0.000
Whlsl 1000 0.0050 0.075 0.65 14.3 1.1 4.2 1.2 0.19 0.000
Rtail 1000 0.0070 0.060 0.02 8.0 0.9 2.8 1.0 0.14 0.000
Meals 1000 0.0070 0.067 -0.34 5.6 1.0 -0.4 0.7 0.15 0.000
Fin 1000 0.0070 0.070 0.56 14.3 1.2 5.1 1.3 0.17 0.000
Other 1000 0.0050 0.069 0.36 9.1 1.1 4.3 1.1 0.14 0.000
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of the monthly excess returns (i.e.
Rk   Rf )) of the 30 industry portfolios: average; standard devia-
tions; skewness; kurtosis; CAPM-; , the exposure to the skewness
risk (see equation 1.8); , the exposure to the kurtosis risk (see equa-
tion 1.9) and the rst-order autocorrelation coecient (with p-value)
of portfolio excess returns.
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Panel A: Value Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=low 1000 0.0050 0.058 -0.02 7.9 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.13 0.000
2 1000 0.0060 0.055 -0.09 8.0 1.0 2.7 0.9 0.09 0.003
3 1000 0.0060 0.054 -0.22 7.8 0.9 2.3 0.9 0.06 0.039
4 1000 0.0060 0.061 1.26 18.8 1.1 6.4 1.3 0.17 0.000
5 1000 0.0070 0.057 0.85 15.3 1.0 5.1 1.1 0.14 0.000
6 1000 0.0070 0.062 0.95 19.2 1.1 5.6 1.3 0.17 0.000
7 1000 0.0070 0.067 1.84 23.4 1.1 8.1 1.4 0.16 0.000
8 1000 0.0090 0.070 2.13 27.2 1.2 8.9 1.5 0.19 0.000
9 1000 0.0100 0.076 1.33 17.3 1.2 7.5 1.5 0.14 0.000
10=high 1000 0.0110 0.094 2.41 27.3 1.5 11.1 1.9 0.16 0.000
Panel B: Size Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=small 1000 0.0110 0.103 3.71 39.6 1.4 11.9 1.8 0.22 0.000
2 1000 0.0100 0.090 2.27 25.0 1.4 8.5 1.6 0.19 0.000
3 1000 0.0090 0.082 1.94 23.3 1.3 8.1 1.5 0.22 0.000
4 1000 0.0090 0.076 1.56 18.8 1.3 7.3 1.4 0.19 0.000
5 1000 0.0090 0.073 1.16 16.1 1.2 6.6 1.4 0.18 0.000
6 1000 0.0080 0.070 1.04 15.1 1.2 6.5 1.4 0.18 0.000
7 1000 0.0080 0.066 0.81 14.0 1.2 5.7 1.3 0.15 0.000
8 1000 0.0070 0.062 0.76 13.8 1.1 5.4 1.2 0.14 0.000
9 1000 0.0070 0.059 0.57 13.4 1.1 4.8 1.2 0.12 0.000
10=big 1000 0.0060 0.051 0.09 9.4 0.9 3.1 0.9 0.09 0.006
Panel C: Momentum Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=low 995 0.0000 0.099 1.84 19.2 1.6 11.1 1.9 0.16 0.000
2 995 0.0040 0.083 1.84 23.2 1.3 8.9 1.7 0.15 0.000
3 995 0.0040 0.071 1.53 21.8 1.2 7.4 1.5 0.13 0.000
4 995 0.0050 0.065 1.55 20.5 1.1 7.3 1.4 0.13 0.000
5 995 0.0060 0.061 1.31 20.4 1.0 5.7 1.2 0.11 0.000
6 995 0.0060 0.059 0.76 14.8 1.0 4.9 1.2 0.11 0.001
7 995 0.0070 0.056 0.18 10.4 1.0 3.5 1.0 0.07 0.036
8 995 0.0080 0.054 0.04 7.7 0.9 2.6 0.9 0.09 0.006
9 995 0.0090 0.057 -0.30 6.6 1.0 1.5 0.8 0.06 0.061
10=high 995 0.0120 0.066 -0.51 5.2 1.0 0.1 0.7 0.08 0.016
Table 1.3: Summary statistics of the monthly excess returns (i.e.
Rk Rf ) of the size, value, and momentum decile portfolios: average;
standard deviations; skewness; kurtosis; CAPM-; , the exposure
to the skewness risk (see equation 1.8); , the exposure to the kurtosis
risk (see equation 1.9), and the rst-order autocorrelation coecient
(with p-value) of portfolio excess returns.
1.4. DATA 1-27
stocks into 17 (30) industry sectors, based on the SIC codes of the
previous year.6 The advantage of industry portfolios is that while
similar companies are in the same industry category, the dierences
between the dierent industries are considerable. Industry portfo-
lios, therefore, give a broad overview of the economy. An alternative
way to group rms into dierent portfolios is to take some criterion
and then form decile portfolios. Doing so results in a large spread
of the chosen criterion between the portfolios. Black et al. (1972)
were the rst to use this method by grouping portfolios based on the
past CAPM- = cov(rm; R
e)= var(rm) of the assets. Later, Fama
and French (1992) and many others used value and size portfolios
to study size and value anomalies. However, this method may also
yield spurious results because of data snooping (see Lo and MacKin-
lay (1990) and Conrad et al. (2003)). From the Fama-French data
library, the value, size, and momentum decile portfolios are used.
The 10-value portfolios are formed every July by means of sorting the
book-to-market ratio of the previous year. The size decile portfolios
for July until the following June are based on the market capitaliza-
tion in June of the previous year from all available assets listed on
the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The momentum decile portfolios
are calculated based on the returns between t   2 and t   12. To
retain an asset in a momentum portfolio, the prices in t 13 and the
capitalization of that asset in t  1 must be available. An extension
of Black et al. (1972) is to use higher moment risk factors instead of
the CAPM risk factor, , for forming decile portfolios. The aim of
this procedure is to obtain assets that have risk exposures that are as
6The data and a detailed description of the industry sec-
tors can be found in the Fama-French data library at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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dierent from higher order risk as possible. Analogous to Kraus and
Litzenberger (1976) and Post et al. (2008), decile portfolios based on
the skewness risk
i =
E
h 
RM   E(RM )2 (Ri   E(Ri))i
E
h
(RM   E(RM ))3
i (1.8)
and additionally to them on the kurtosis risk
i =
E
h 
RM   E(RM )3 (Ri   E(Ri))i
E
h
(RM   E(RM ))4
i (1.9)
are formed, where i and i are generalizations of the CAPM- for
the higher moments risk factors. The  and  portfolios are formed
every July based on the data of the previous 36 months. The deciles
are calculated on the NYSE data. The portfolios contain all the
common stocks from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, where the
returns of the previous 36 months are available.
An overview of the return characteristics can be found in Tables
1.1 to 1.4. The rst column includes the number of observations
for each portfolio. For every portfolio, all available data points are
used, so the number of observations varies slightly. Except for the
momentum portfolios, all Fama-French data range from July 1926 to
December 2009. The momentum portfolios begin in January 1927,
as the returns for the preceding 12 months are needed to calculate
momentum. Thereturn data from  and  portfolios are available
from July 1929 to December 2009. This shorter time horizon stems
from the 36-month formation period for those portfolios.
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Panel A: -Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=low 964 0.0070 0.060 -0.20 6.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.06 0.070
2 964 0.0060 0.056 -0.40 8.0 0.9 1.5 0.8 0.12 0.000
3 964 0.0070 0.055 0.25 9.2 0.9 3.2 0.9 0.07 0.034
4 964 0.0070 0.057 0.76 12.1 1.0 4.5 1.1 0.10 0.002
5 964 0.0070 0.057 0.63 11.7 1.0 4.2 1.0 0.12 0.000
6 964 0.0070 0.059 0.14 7.8 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.07 0.034
7 964 0.0060 0.062 0.51 12.7 1.1 4.1 1.2 0.11 0.000
8 964 0.0060 0.069 0.80 14.8 1.2 5.4 1.3 0.14 0.000
9 964 0.0060 0.078 1.54 20.7 1.3 7.9 1.6 0.16 0.000
10=high 964 0.0050 0.087 0.99 15.4 1.5 6.7 1.6 0.14 0.000
Panel B: -Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=low 964 0.0050 0.043 -0.37 7.8 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.14 0.000
2 964 0.0050 0.047 -0.22 10.6 0.8 1.8 0.8 0.14 0.000
3 964 0.0060 0.050 0.22 10.0 0.8 2.9 0.9 0.07 0.022
4 964 0.0070 0.057 0.95 14.4 1.0 5.0 1.1 0.09 0.004
5 964 0.0060 0.060 0.23 9.1 1.0 3.2 1.0 0.08 0.015
6 964 0.0070 0.067 0.44 11.1 1.2 4.2 1.2 0.08 0.011
7 964 0.0070 0.071 0.70 12.0 1.2 5.4 1.3 0.07 0.026
8 964 0.0070 0.076 0.56 11.8 1.3 5.2 1.4 0.13 0.000
9 964 0.0060 0.087 0.97 14.4 1.5 7.1 1.6 0.12 0.000
10=high 964 0.0080 0.100 1.00 12.6 1.7 8.3 1.8 0.13 0.000
Table 1.4: Summary statistics of the monthly excess returns (i.e.
Rk  Rf ) of the  and  decile portfolios: Average; standard devia-
tions; skewness; kurtosis; CAPM-; , the exposure to the skewness
risk (see equation 1.8); , the exposure to the kurtosis risk (see equa-
tion 1.9) and the rst-order autocorrelation coecient (with p-value)
of portfolio excess returns.
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Figure 1.1: Average monthly excess returns (i.e. Rk   Rf ) of the
dierent decile portfolios
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The average returns for small companies and for stocks with a
low book-to-market ratio and a high past performance are better, as
Figure 1.1 depicts. These eects were to be expected and were doc-
umented in such previous studies as Stattman (1980), Banz (1981),
Fama and French (1992, 1993), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
A lower coskewness and a higher co-kurtosis also result in higher re-
turns. The return variations between high and low  and  risk are
considerably smaller than the value, size, and momentum eects.
This may indicate that  and  are poor indicators for the future
skewness and kurtosis risks of the assets.
For the 30 industry portfolios, the correlation between  and 
is 0.797, the correlation between  and  is 0.899, and the correla-
tion between  and  is 0.941. This means that a large part of the
information on the higher moments is already in the lower moments
and may indicate that incorporating higher order moments may not
add much additional information. This high correlation is also the
reason why no grouping with -portfolios is included in the analysis:
it adds no additional information.
The last two columns of the tables provide the rst order auto-
correlation of monthly returns and the p-value for the null hypothesis
that there is no autocorrelation. Signicant autocorrelation can be
found in the returns in a large majority of the assets. Therefore,
Newey-West autocorrelation corrected standard errors will be used
for all test statistics in the empirical analysis.
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1.5 Empirical analysis
In this section, the empirical results will be discussed. In a rst step,
polynomial kernels up to order three are estimated. Quadratic and
cubic kernels turn out to have increasing parts if estimated on indus-
trial portfolio data. To check for the signicance of the increasing
parts of the kernel, the next step is to remove the increasing parts by
means of a at line. However, this makes the t to the data poorer.
A further possibility to estimate kernels is to increase the order of
the polynomial further. However, except for the return data of the
momentum portfolio, there is no evidence for a kernel of higher or-
der. For the momentum portfolio data, the kernel then turns out to
be clearly U-shaped. The estimation of a piecewise linear kernel and
further robustness checks will conrm the previous results.
1.5.1 Linear, quadratic and cubic pricing kernels
Figure 1.2 provides all of the estimated pricing kernels. The quadratic
and cubic kernels are estimated by GMM. For purposes of an in-
dependent comparison, the linear benchmark CAPM kernel is also
shown. The cubic and quadratic pricing kernels are similar, indi-
cating that the cubic kernel does not behave in a totally dierent
way from the quadratic kernel. The quadratic pricing kernels are
all positive, and the shape is generally convex (for the cubic kernel
evidence is more mixed), which is in line with the representative ex-
pected utility maximizer with decreasing marginal utility. Not in
line with that are the increasing parts of some pricing kernels. The
range of the x-axis of these gures is chosen carefully: the range
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Figure 1.2: Estimated polynomial pricing kernels. The full line is
the quadratic pricing kernel; the dashed line is the cubic pricing
kernel, and the dotted line is the benchmark CAPM kernel. Esti-
mation details for the quadratic and cubic kernel can be found in
subsection 1.3.3 and in subsection 1.3.1 for the CAPM benchmark.
1-34 ARTICLE 1. IS THE PRICING KERNEL U-SHAPED?
between -0.105 and 0.1, which covers 95% of the market returns ob-
served. Outside of this range, the number of observations is small;
therefore, the estimation of the kernel is imprecise. A broader range
on the x-axis would make the U-shapes obviously more impressive;
nonetheless, only a few observations would exist in that additional
area, and the kernel estimates would not be very reliable. The in-
creasing regions observed in the industrial portfolios are because of
areas where enough observations for reliable estimation are available.
For the other portfolios, no evidence for increasing parts is available.
Polynomial pricing kernels up to order 3 are estimated in Ta-
ble 1.5 by GMM. The J-statistic shows that a linear pricing kernel
(the CAPM) is misspecied|that is, the moment conditions are sta-
tistically dierent from zero. Only for the dataset with the value and
size portfolios does a linear pricing kernel appear to be appropriate.
For the linear model with the  and  portfolios, which should espe-
cially take into account the higher-order risk, the J-statistic is only
weakly signicant at the 10% level in the linear specication. This
may indicate two things: either  and  are poor indicators for the
higher-order risk of the next year, or there is not much nonlinearity
in the pricing kernel.
The J-statistic for the quadratic kernel of the momentum port-
folio is still signicant at the 1% level. Up to this point, everything
else appears to be reasonably specied with a quadratic kernel. For
example, as Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) also show, the quadratic
term is positive for all portfolios. However, the quadratic parameters
are not very signicant. These t-statistics are in line with Pot and
Wang (2010), who nd the polynomial terms of order 2 or more to
be insignicant. The Wald test, which tests the null hypothesis that
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Panel A: Linear Kernel (CAPM)
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 1.01 ** 1.02 ** 1.01 ** 1.01 ** 1.01 **
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
1 -2.17 ** -2.33 ** -2.20 ** -1.61 ** -2.01 **
( 0.62) ( 0.60) ( 0.59) ( 0.57) ( 0.59)
J 33 ** 51 ** 20 67 ** 27
Panel B: Quadratic Kernel
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.93 ** 0.92 ** 1.01 ** 0.98 ** 0.98 **
( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.03)
1 -1.94 * -2.65 ** -2.07 ** -2.31 ** -2.78 **
( 0.99) ( 0.96) ( 0.66) ( 0.73) ( 0.86)
2 26.65 y 33.26 * 1.27 9.66 13.87
(15.05) (15.40) ( 5.12) ( 6.91) (10.13)
J 23 40 y 20 55 ** 18
W 3.1 y 4.7 * 0.06 2.0 1.9
Panel C: Cubic Kernel
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.83 ** 0.90 ** 0.98 ** 1.04 ** 1.02 **
( 0.08) ( 0.07) ( 0.06) ( 0.04) ( 0.05)
1 1.53 -2.05 -1.25 -4.18 ** -4.13 *
( 1.89) ( 1.54) ( 1.68) ( 1.23) ( 1.62)
2 54.99 * 42.53 y 8.48 -8.05 0.02
( 27.85) ( 23.95) ( 18.19) (12.20) (17.06)
3 -143.31 y -36.46 -32.18 82.43 y 66.85
( 79.89) ( 69.43) ( 63.28) (43.18) (59.60)
J 17 40 y 20 64 ** 17
W 3.9 5 y 0.26 4.4 2.7
Table 1.5: GMM Estimation of the polynomial pricing kernels, L =
0+1rm+2r
2
m+3r
3
m, for the 17 and 30 industry portfolios (Ind17
and Ind30), for the 10-value and 10-size portfolios (VS), for the 10-
value, 10-size, and 10-momentum portfolios (VSM) and the  and 
portfolios. Estimation details can be found in subsection 1.3.3. The
Wald statistic tests if the quadratic (cubic) kernel is dierent from
the linear kernel. y, *, and ** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
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the model is linear, shows that for the industry portfolios, a linear
kernel can be rejected at the 10% signicance level. The linear term
in the quadratic kernel is negative, as expected from the CAPM.
Moving to a cubic kernel reveals no improvement in terms of the
J-statistic, and the sign of the cubic parameter is ambiguous. The
Wald test also does not show large dierences from a linear model.
The likelihood ratio test in Table 1.10 shows that for the 17 industry
portfolios, the cubic model is almost signicantly dierent from the
quadratic model at the 1% level. Moreover, the parameter for the
cubic term is dierent from zero at the 10% level. For the other
portfolios, there appears to be no reason to move to a cubic kernel.
Up to the momentum portfolio with its highly signicant J-statistic,
all models can be reasonably well estimated by a polynomial up to
order 3. Some increasing regions are found in the kernel of the in-
dustry portfolios. The next step is to examine the increasing regions
in more detail.
1.5.2 A closer look at the increasing regions of
the kernel
If the kernel is not just linear, a quadratic pricing kernel has an
increasing region. Therefore, it is rst checked whether or not that
region is in an area that includes some observations of rm. If there
are no observations in that area, the increasing region is irrelevant;
and if there are only a few market returns in the increasing region,
then the result is most likely a statistic artifact. Rmin, the minimum
of a quadratic pricing kernel, can be determined by setting the rst
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derivative of the kernel to zero:
Rmin =
 1
22
: (1.10)
In the cubic case, the function can have up to one local minimum
and one local maximum, which are given by:
Rextrema =
2 
p
22   313
33
:
Table 1.6 provides the minima of the quadratic kernel and the lo-
cal extrema of the cubic kernel. The plausibility of increasing parts
of the kernel is measured by the probability that a market return
is in the increasing area; for the quadratic kernel this is, for exam-
ple, p(rm  Rmin). This probability is measured by the number of
months the kernel was in an increasing area divided by the number of
all observations. For the industry portfolios, a monthly return larger
than 3.6 and 4%, respectively, is sucient for belonging to the in-
creasing part of the kernel. This implies that in more than 25% of all
time periods, the realized pricing kernel was in the increasing region.
This observation is supported by the results from the cubic kernel.
Not much evidence of an increasing kernel can be found in the other
portfolios. With, at most, 2.6% of all months, the quadratic pricing
kernel was increasing. For the value/size portfolios, the cubic kernel
implies that there are no local extrema|that is, the pricing kernel
is decreasing everywhere. For the value, size and momentum, and 
and  portfolios, the local maxima are in extremely negative returns,
and the local minima in extremely positive returns. Therefore, the
kernel is falling.
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Kernel Variable Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
Quadratic Rmin 0.036 0.040 0.818 0.119 0.100
p(rm  Rmin) 0.279 0.250 0.000 0.016 0.025
Cubic Rmin 0.036 0.040 0.818 0.119 0.100
p(rm  Rmin) 0.279 0.250 0.000 0.016 0.025
Rmax 0.036 0.040 0.818 0.119 0.100
p(rm  Rmax) 0.279 0.250 0.000 0.016 0.025
Table 1.6: Global minimum (maximum), that is, the turning points
of the quadratic and cubic pricing kernels and fraction of the values
of the market return that are larger than the turning points.
rmin P (rm  rmin) Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0.1 0.0250 0.2859 0.2139 0.0597 0.7984 0.9977
0.2 0.0050 0.1536 0.0870 0.4042 0.5713 0.4783
0.3 0.0030 0.1224 0.0622 0.6470 0.3947 0.3476
0.4 0.0000 0.1090 0.0523 0.7845 0.3212 0.2932
Table 1.7: P-values for a Wald test of the null hypothesis that rmin is
the global minimum of the quadratic pricing kernel. The second col-
umn shows the empirical likelihood that the market return is larger
than or equal to rmin. The test is given for the 17 and 30 industries;
the value and size; the value, size, and momentum; and the  and 
portfolios.
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A next step is to check if these increasing parts are statistically
signicant. One way to do that is to test if the minimum of the
quadratic kernel is within the observed data (or at least in an area
where almost no data are observed). If this can be rejected, the
pricing kernel has increasing parts in the relevant range of market
portfolio returns. The null hypothesis is, therefore, that the mini-
mum of a quadratic pricing kernel is at rmin. Equation (1.10) implies
for the null hypothesis that
1 + 2rmin2 = 0:
The null hypothesis of Rmin = rmin is tested for rmin of 10, 20,
30, and 40%. In the case of rmin = 0:1, only 2.5% of all market
excess returns are larger than rmin, and in the case of rmin = 0:4,
no observed market excess return is larger. If the minimum of the
pricing kernel is at one of these levels, increasing parts of the pricing
kernel are in areas with (almost) no observations. Therefore, they
would be irrelevant; that is, if the null hypothesis of the test cannot
be rejected, increasing parts in the kernel cannot be signicantly
statistically supported. Table 1.7 includes the p-values of the Wald
test. As shown, in no case is the estimated minimum of the quadratic
pricing kernel dierent from rmin at the 5% level. A model with an
increasing kernel is, therefore, not signicantly dierent from one
without: that is, the increasing parts are not signicant.
A quadratic kernel always has an increasing part. To ensure that
this part is not just an artifact from the functional form, a new kernel
is used. The basic kernel has a quadratic form, but the slope of the
kernel right to the minima is set to zero: that is, after the minimum,
the kernel becomes a at line, as illustrated with the dashed line
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in Figure 1.3 for the estimation for the 30-industry dataset. The
estimated parameters of these kernels are in Panel A of Table 1.8.
The parameters themselves are similar to the quadratic kernels in
Table 1.5. However, the value of the J-statistic in four of the ve
portfolios is larger than in the quadratic case. The J-statistic is
the sum of the weighted quadratic moment deviation divided by the
number of time periods|that is, the criterion minimized by GMM.
The smaller values indicate that the increasing parts in the pricing
kernel improve the t of the model.
The earlier approach can be generalized. A maximal level of
the slope of the kernel, m, is xed. If the slope of the estimated
quadratic kernel would be larger than m, the slope is set to m. With
m = 0, the kernel is as previously, and if m = +1, the kernel is
a standard quadratic kernel. If the kernel were decreasing, as the
representative agent model suggests, one would expect the kernel
to continue at one point in the decreasing part of the U with a
linear negative slope: that is, m  0. m > 0 (given that 2 > 0)
indicates the opposite: the linear part starts after the minima and
is increasing. The dotted line in Figure 1.3 illustrates this. With
m = 8:71, the positive slope starts far outside the plotted range;
therefore, the kernel is U-shaped. An estimate of m can be found in
the lower part of Table 1.8. m is positive in four of the ve portfolios
such that the kernel contains an increasing part. Nonetheless, m is
not signicantly dierent from zero; that is, there is no statistically
signicant evidence for increasing parts in the pricing kernel.
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Figure 1.3: Estimated pricing kernels for the 30 industry portfolios.
The full line is the quadratic pricing kernel; the dashed line is the
quadratic kernel, which is at after the minimum; and the dotted
line is the quadratic kernel, which continues linear after the slope
8.71. Estimation details can be found in subsection 1.3.3.
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Panel A: Quadratic Kernel Flat after Minimum
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 2.4 0.94 ** 1.01 ** 0.96 ** 0.99 **
( 5.5) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.05) ( 0.05)
1 33.6 -0.42 -2.07 ** -1.51 -2.40 **
( 93.1) ( 5.53) ( 0.66) ( 2.30) ( 0.77)
2 194.9 42.24 1.27 19.86 6.89
(337.3) (50.92) ( 5.12) (31.20) (19.38)
J 22 47 * 20 60 ** 23
Panel B: Quadratic Kernel until Slope is m, afterwards Linear
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.84 ** 0.91 ** 1.0 1.04 ** 0.97 **
( 0.13) ( 0.08) ( 2.2) ( 0.04) ( 0.04)
1 2.61 -2.61 * -1.5 -4.18 ** -2.91 y
( 8.32) ( 1.17) ( 42.8) ( 1.23) ( 1.51)
2 90.75 38.89 3.6 -8.87 15.52
(68.65) (29.54) (154.2) (12.11) (13.95)
m 3.80 8.71 -1.9 82.16 y 7.55
( 4.37) ( 7.90) ( 1.6) (42.95) (68.62)
J 20 40 y 20 63 ** 18
Table 1.8: Panel A shows the estimation of a quadratic pricing kernel
when the kernel becomes at and when the quadratic function is
minimal. Panel B shows a quadratic kernel in which the slope is
restricted to be smaller or equal tom. If the slope is in a certain range
larger than m, the kernel is made linear with a slope of m in that
range. Estimations were done for the 17 and 30 industry portfolios
(Ind17 and Ind30), for the 10-value and 10-size portfolios (VS); for
the 10-value, 10-size, and 10-momentum portfolios (VSM); and for
the  and  portfolios. Estimation details can be found in subsection
1.3.3. The Wald statistic tests if the quadratic (cubic) kernel is
dierent from the linear kernel. y, *, and ** indicate signicance at
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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1.5.3 Higher-order pricing kernel
Up to now, only polynomials up to the third order have been taken
into account. Higher-order polynomials may reveal even more in-
formation. In the next step, polynomials up to order 7 are consid-
ered. Table 1.9 gives the p-values of the J-statistics that check if
the moment conditions are satised for the dierent polynomials.
For quadratic and cubic kernels, the J-statistic is not signicant for
most portfolios. Only for the value, size, and momentum portfolio
does a kernel above order 3 help. In that instance, the J-statistics
are highly signicant until order 5 and not signicant after orders 6
and 7. In the case of the 30 industry, the J-statistics turn out to be
insignicant for a quadratic kernel but signicant for some higher-
order polynomials. Intuitively, one would expect that a higher-order
kernel would always t the data better than a lower order kernel
and, therefore, that the J-statistic would fall with the order of the
polynomial since a higher-order kernel is, by denition, always able
to t the data at least as well as a kernel of higher order. However,
the more parameters the model has, the less over-identifying restric-
tions exist; therefore, the degrees of freedom of the 2 distribution
of the J-statistic become smaller with the higher polynomial order
of the kernel, and this has a decreasing eect on the p-value. The
rst eect is typically stronger, and, therefore, the p-values are rising
most of the time with the order of the polynomial of the kernel.
If a model with a kernel of a higher order does not perform better
than one with a lower order, there is no reason to choose the model
with more parameters. The likelihood ratio test checks if two nested
models are statistically dierent. If the higher-order model is not dif-
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(c) Order 6
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(d) Order 7
Figure 1.4: Pricing kernels for the value, size, and momentum port-
folios for polynomial kernels of orders 4 to 7. The dotted line is the
benchmark CAPM. Estimation details can be found in subsection
1.3.3.
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Order Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
1 0.010 0.009 0.466 0.000 0.143
2 0.114 0.079 0.389 0.002 0.543
3 0.342 0.065 0.358 0.000 0.490
4 0.264 0.014 0.412 0.000 0.373
5 0.249 0.028 0.364 0.000 0.405
6 0.233 0.018 0.262 0.256 0.299
7 0.469 0.044 0.237 0.275 0.678
Table 1.9: P-values of J-test: The null hypothesis H0 is that the
polynomial pricing kernels of orders 1 to 7 are able to explain the
moment conditions.
ferent, then it is better to choose the lower-order model. Table 1.10
shows that the linear kernel can be rejected in almost all cases against
the higher-order kernels. The exception is the value size portfolios.
Linear kernels are, therefore, not sucient. Except for the data with
the momentum portfolios, all other datasets can be modeled with a
cubic kernel in the case of the 17-industry dataset and a quadratic
kernel for the other portfolios. In the case of the momentum port-
folios, the kernels with orders 6 and 7 are always dierent from the
kernels with orders 1 to 3. The kernels of orders 4, 5, 6, and 7 as
estimated with the momentum data are shown in Figure 1.4. The
kernels of orders 4 and 5 have a signicant J-statistic (i.e., are mis-
specied) and are not signicantly dierent from the kernels of orders
2 and 3. Put dierently, they have practically no increasing parts
(for that see gure 1.2(d)). The two kernels with the higher order
are statistically signicantly dierent from the lower-order kernels
and are well specied. The momentum portfolio, therefore, requires
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Panel A: H0 is a Linear Kernel
Order Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
2 0.001 0.001 1.000 0.001 0.003
3 0.000 0.004 0.859 0.229 0.010
4 0.001 0.123 0.528 0.067 0.037
5 0.002 0.044 0.641 0.193 0.040
6 0.003 0.100 0.870 0.000 0.095
7 0.001 0.026 0.868 0.000 0.016
Panel B: H0 is a Quadratic Kernel
Order Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
3 0.012 0.648 0.470 1.000 0.646
4 0.047 1.000 0.295 1.000 1.000
5 0.073 1.000 0.433 1.000 0.804
6 0.098 1.000 0.724 0.000 0.987
7 0.031 0.648 0.743 0.000 0.253
Panel C: H0 is a Cubic Kernel
Order Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
4 1.000 1.000 0.166 0.040 1.000
5 0.733 1.000 0.330 0.208 0.677
6 0.689 1.000 0.673 0.000 0.987
7 0.204 0.537 0.700 0.000 0.173
Table 1.10: P-values of likelihood ratio tests. The linear, quadratic,
and cubic kernels are tested against pricing kernels up to order 7.
The null hypothesis H0 is the linear, quadratic, or cubic pricing
kernel.
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a kernel of at least order 6. The momentum kernel is U-shaped and
contains an increasing part. The lower-order kernels, which are un-
able to explain the average returns of the momentum portfolios, did
not contain an increasing part, showing also that a U-shaped kernel
is needed to explain the risk premium on the momentum portfolios.
In line with Dittmar (2002) and Pot (2006), a kernel up to or-
der 3 is required in most cases, considering the J-statistic and the
likelihood ratio test. The only exception is the dataset with the mo-
mentum portfolio. However, the fact that the U-shape of the kernel
becomes massively stronger with the use of a higher order kernel
even strengthens the hypothesis of U-shaped kernels.
1.5.4 Piecewise linear kernel
Up to this point, the focus has been on polynomials. A major prob-
lem, especially with the quadratic kernel, is that there are increasing
parts of the kernel almost by construction. To verify that these
increasing parts are not an artifact of the chosen functional form,
piecewise linear kernels are estimated:
L = 0 + 1rm +
8><>:
0 for rm < q1
2(rm   q1) for q1  rm < q2
2(rm   q1) + 3(rm   q2) for q2  rm < q3:
(1.11)
In this setup, there must not be any increasing part in the kernel.
In the following, the market portfolio returns are split into three
quantiles (with 33% of the observations of rM in each), and the
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kernel is estimated. The estimations can be found in Table 1.11,
and the piecewise linear kernel is plotted together with the quadratic
kernel in Figure 1.5. The specication tests are quite similar to those
for the quadratic and cubic kernels. The only exception is the kernel
estimated from the  and  portfolios, which start with an increasing
part, fall, and then increase again. This change is strong enough that
a Wald test indicates that the model is statistically dierent from a
linear model. In the plots, all kernels are more or less moving around
the quadratic kernel. Four of the ve portfolios show an increasing
kernel in the third quantile. If this slope is signicantly positive, it
can be checked using a Wald test. The p-values for the 17 and 30
industry, the VSM, and the  and  portfolios are 0.367, 0.142, 0.327,
and 0.459. This shows again that the kernel might be U-shaped, and
also that on this occasion, statistical signicance is an issue.
1.5.5 Robustness checks
All the estimations have been made using ve sets of portfolios, which
can be seen as a rst robustness check. A next obvious robustness
check is to pool all datasets (i.e., 30 industries, value, size, momen-
tum, and  and -portfolios); the results were comparable to the
results of the 30 industries-portfolio. Using more assets also did not
improve the signicance of the results. Further, using the identity
matrix, the covariance matrix of the returns or a standard covariance
matrix (not taking into account the serial correlation) as the inverse
of the weighting matrixW does not change the general shape of the
pricing kernels. The estimations via GMM and OLS are, further-
more, similar. The next step is to check the time stability and to
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(c) Value and size
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(d) Value, size and momentum
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
1.
4
Market Excess Return
Pr
ic
in
g 
Ke
rn
e
l
(e)  and 
Figure 1.5: Piecewise liner pricing kernel (dashed line) compared
with the quadratic pricing kernel (full line) and the benchmark
CAPM (dotted line). Estimation details can be found in subsection
1.3.3.
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Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.69 * 1.00 ** 0.91 ** 1.01 ** 1.60 **
( 0.32) ( 0.27) ( 0.33) ( 0.25) ( 0.26)
1 -9.67 -5.39 -3.75 -3.80 6.39
( 6.37) ( 5.15) ( 5.92) ( 4.59) ( 4.33)
2 12.11 -4.04 5.49 -2.93 -30.30 *
(15.87) (13.32) (16.25) (12.04) ( 12.16)
3 1.28 15.52 -4.53 9.62 26.33 **
(12.05) (11.13) (11.31) ( 8.87) ( 10.05)
J 22 41 y 21 54 ** 14
W 2.9 4.7 y 0.2 3.5 7 *
Table 1.11: Estimation of the piecewise linear pricing kernel (i.e.,
equation (1.11)), for the 17 and 30 industry portfolios (Ind17 and
Ind30), the 10-value and 10-size portfolios (VS), the 10-value, 10-
size, and 10-momentum portfolios (VSM), and the  and  portfo-
lios. Estimation details can be found in subsection 1.3.3. The Wald
statistic tests whether or not the quadratic (cubic) kernel is dierent
from the linear kernel. y, *, and ** indicate signicance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Time period Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
 1950 0.232
p(rm  Rmin) 0.014
1951-1970 0.020 0.478 0.028
p(rm  Rmin) 0.417 0.000 0.346
1971-1990 0.113 0.047 0.015 0.053
p(rm  Rmin) 0.025 0.221 0.454 0.154
1991-2009 0.084 0.019 0.012 -0.010
p(rm  Rmin) 0.017 0.435 0.527 0.674
Table 1.12: Global minimum of the quadratic pricing kernel and
fraction of the values of the market return larger than the turning
point. If the estimated quadratic term had a negative sign, the cell
has been left empty.
check if there are any issues with multicollinearity.
The increasing parts of the pricing kernels are the main points
of interest. A good indicator for these is the global minima of a
quadratic pricing kernel. In Table 1.12, these are calculated for sev-
eral time windows of approximately 20 years. In cases where the
quadratic function had a maximum instead of a minimum, the cells
are left open. For the period before 1950, including the Great De-
pression and World War II, all kernels are almost linear (exact coef-
cients are not tabulated), and most of the second-order coecients
are slightly negative. In the case of the 30 industry portfolios, the
quadratic term is slightly positive with a value of 3.64. This implies
a turning point at 23.2% market returns per month. The proba-
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bility that this or an even larger return occurs is 1.4%, which is
extremely small. In the other much less extraordinary time periods,
most pricing kernels are convex and, therefore, have a minimum. In
over one-half of the sub periods after 1950, the probability of being
in an increasing part of the kernel exceeds 20%. In contrast to the
estimation over the whole time period in Table 1.5, the momentum
portfolio already shows a quadratic kernel with increasing parts. For
the whole period, a kernel of at least order 6 was needed to see this.
However, the evidence for increasing parts in the pricing kernel be-
comes much smaller for the industry portfolios. Overall, there is
evidence for increasing pricing kernels after 1950.
Another potential issue is multicollinearity, since rm, r
2
m, and r
3
m
are by denition correlated. To address this issue, estimations with
orthogonalized regressors are performed. That is,
L = 0 + 1rm + 2
 
r2m   arm

+ 3
 
r3m   br2m   crm

:
is the estimated kernel. a, b and c are dened such that
0 = cov(rm; r
2
m   arm) = cov(rm; r3m   br2m   crm)
= cov(r2m; r
3
m   br2m   crm):
The results for the estimation of the pricing kernel with these or-
thogonalized factors (or polynomials) can be found in Table 1.13.
As shown, these are comparable with the results in Table 1.5{that
is, they show that the pricing kernel for the nonmomentum port-
folios must be around orders 2 or 3. In addition, the signs of the
polynomials are identical. The results are, therefore, robust for mul-
ticollinearity.
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Panel A: Quadratic Kernel (Orthogonalized)
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.93 ** 0.92 ** 1.01 ** 0.98 ** 0.98 **
( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.03)
1 -1.94 * -2.66 ** -2.07 ** -2.31 ** -2.78 **
( 0.99) ( 0.96) ( 0.66) ( 0.73) ( 0.86)
2 26.71 y 33.33 * 1.32 9.72 13.94
(15.06) (15.40) ( 5.13) ( 6.91) (10.14)
J 23 40 y 20 55 ** 18
W 3.1 y 4.7 * 0.07 2.0 1.9
Panel B: Cubic Kernel (Orthogonalized)
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.83 ** 0.90 ** 0.98 ** 1.03 ** 1.02 **
( 0.08) ( 0.07) ( 0.06) ( 0.04) ( 0.05)
1 1.40 -2.11 -1.22 -4.14 ** -4.16 *
( 1.89) ( 1.53) ( 1.69) ( 1.24) ( 1.62)
2 55.57 * 41.88 y 8.82 -5.77 -0.49
( 27.97) ( 23.72) ( 18.23) (12.41) (16.97)
3 -150.48 y -39.74 -34.83 81.66 y 68.55
( 84.22) ( 71.80) ( 66.29) (44.86) (61.45)
J 17 40 y 20 65 ** 18
W 4.0 5 y 0.28 4.4 2.7
Table 1.13: Estimation of the orthogonalized pricing kernel, L =
0 + 1rm + 2
 
r2m   arm

+ 3
 
r3m   br2m   crm

, kernels for the
17 and 30 industry portfolios (Ind17 and Ind30); the 10-value and
the 10-size portfolios (VS); the 10-value, 10-size, and-10 momentum
portfolios (VSM); and the  and  portfolios. Estimation details can
be found in subsection 1.3.3. The Wald statistic tests whether or
not the quadratic (cubic) kernel is dierent from the linear kernel.
Estimation details can be found in subsection 1.3.3. y, *, and **
indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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1.6 Utility function of the representative
agent
Assuming there is a representative agent, what would his utility func-
tion look like? In equation (1.4), it was shown that the pricing kernel
is a constant times the marginal utility, i.e. L(rm) = u0(rm)=u0(c0).
Integrating this implies
u(rm) = constant+

u0(c0)
Z rM
 1
L(r)dr:
This analysis requires that markets be complete and that the repre-
sentative agent has correct beliefs and an increasing, concave utility
function. None of these assumptions must be satised. Nevertheless,
it is interesting to see the shape of the utility function that would
evolve from these assumptions.
If one normalizes =u0(c0) = 1 and sets the utility function at the
left corner of the graph to zero, the utility function implied for the
quadratic, the piecewise linear, and the benchmark CAPM kernel
can be found, as shown in Figure 1.6. The most obvious point is
that all utility functions are quite similar. This ts the fact that
it is dicult to nd statistically signicant dierences between the
dierent kernels. Nonconcavities are especially observed with the
piecewise linear pricing kernel. The problem is that the shape of the
utility function, as implied by the piecewise linear kernel, is dierent
for every portfolio. The quadratic pricing kernel is typically much
closer to the CAPM benchmark. Nonconcavities are observed in the
case of the industry portfolios, but even there they seem to be weak.
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Figure 1.6: Utility function of the representative agent implied by the
pricing kernel in the case of the quadratic pricing kernel (full line),
the piecewise linear pricing kernel (dashed line), and the benchmark
CAPM (dotted line).
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Overall, the eect of the nonconcavities in the utility function seems
to be weak. Their existence could, nonetheless, alter completely the
investment behavior of the representative agent.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper examined the increasing parts of the U-shaped pricing
kernels found in equity data. This has been done in a much broader
way than can be found in the existing literature. In particular, the
estimation on datasets in the industry and momentum portfolios
shows clear evidence for increasing parts in the pricing kernel. To
make sure that these increasing parts are not just an artifact of the
polynomial functional form, other functional forms that allow for
nonincreasing shapes lead to a poorer t for the data. Despite the
fact that the U-shape of the kernel can be shown on many dierent
datasets, time horizons, and functional forms in terms of statistical
signicance, this evidence is weak. This paper shows that analo-
gously to factor models, the value, size, and momentum eect can
be explained by the polynomials of market returns of suciently high
order. Another contribution is that the kernels of these higher-order
polynomials are mainly U-shaped, increasing with positive returns.
This is consistent with a positive premium on coskewness.
An implication of the increasing part of the pricing kernel is that
the economy cannot be modeled by a risk-averse, utility-maximizing
representative agent. This paper shows that this eect is not just a
short-run phenomenon, as with the evidence from stock options data
that typically holds for a specic, typically short, time period. The
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increasing parts in the kernel appear to persist over a time horizon of
more than 80 years. So far, there is no generally accepted economic
explanation for this phenomenon. For future research, it will be
important to check to which degree heterogeneous, mis-estimated
beliefs, Peso problems, incomplete markets, aggregation problems,
and nonstandard preferences contribute to the empirically observed
U-shape. To date, there is clear evidence that it is not possible to
explain the whole phenomenon with only one of those factors.
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1.8 Proof of consistency of the pricing
kernel estimation via factor model (OLS)
This appendix establishes the consistency of the estimation of the
pricing kernel as estimated by the OLS factor model from section
1.3.2. For consistency, a more specic setup is required:
Re;kt   E

Re;kt

= (ft   E(ft))0k + kt (1.12)
E

Re;kt

= 0k+ 

k; (1.13)
where Re;kt are the excess returns of asset k in period t, ft is a
stochastic vector of factors in period t, and the vector k is the
factor exposures of asset k. The risk premia associated with the
factors is the vector . The vectors  and k for k = 1; : : : ;K are
xed but with unknown parameters to estimate. kt and 

k are noise
terms. The OLS estimator of k is ^k and is estimated using:
Re;kt  
1
T
TX
t=1
Re;kt =
 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!0
k + 
k
t :
If the expected value is replaced with the sample average,7 the second
equation can be stated as follows:
1
T
TX
t=1
Re;kt = ^
0
k+ k:
7This replacement is unproblematic, as it is possible to include the estimation
error only in the error term|i.e., k = 

k   E

Re;kt

+ 1
T
PT
t=1R
e;k
t .
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Using OLS,  can be estimated from this equation by
^ =
 
1
K
KX
k=1
^k^
0
k
! 1 
1
T
TX
t=1
Ret
!
with Ret as the vector of the excess returns of all assets in period t.
A consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of ft is
dVar(ft) = 1
T
TX
t=1
 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
! 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!0
:
From Section 1.3.2, it is known that the parameter of interest is
b =   var(ft) 1. An obvious candidate for an estimator of b is,
therefore,
b^ =  dVar(ft) 1^:
The next step is to show that b^ is a consistent estimator. For this,
the following assumptions are required:
 ft is stochastic and

ft   1T
PT
t=1 ft

kt is a martingale dif-
ference sequence for all assets k

1
T
PT
t=1 ft
p! E (ft), where jE (ft)j <1
 E
 
kt
2 
ft   1T
PT
t=1 ft

ft   1T
PT
t=1 ft
0
= t, a posi-
tive denite matrix, with 1T
PT
t=1t converging to a positive
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denite matrix  and
1
T
TX
t=1
 
kt
2 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
! 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!0
p! 

dVar(ft) p! Q = var(ft), where Q is nonsingular

1
K
PT
t=1 k
0
k is a nite nonsingular matrix
 k and l, l 6= k are independent random variables with E(k) =
0 and var(k) = 
2
i <1.
 k is furthermore independent of all ft and 
k
t
The assumptions about ft and 
k
t are standard assumptions to
ensure consistency for the parameters of a regression model with
general heteroskedasticity in the error terms; this model dates back
to Eicker (1967), White (1980), Hansen (1982) and Nicholls and
Pagan (1983). Therefore, the OLS estimator ^k for equation (1.12)
converges to k, that is,
^k
p! k:
If 1=T
PT
t=1R
e;k
t = 
0
k+ k is plugged into ^, the estimator b is
b^ =  dVar(ft) 1^ =  dVar(ft) 1 1
K
KX
k=1
^k^
0
k
! 1 
1
K
KX
k=1
^k
0
k+ k
!
=  dVar(ft) 1 1
K
KX
k=1
^k^
0
k
! 1 
1
K
KX
k=1
^k
0
k+
1
K
KX
k=1
^kk
!
:
1-68 BIBLIOGRAPHY
A rst step to prove the consistency of b^ is to show that
1
K
KX
k=1
^kk
p! 0: (1.14)
^k is a function of ft and 
k
t . k is independent of these two variables.
Therefore, k and ^k are also independent and ^kk is a martingale
dierence sequence. The assumptions further imply bounded co-
variance matrices for k and ft. Therefore, cov(^k; k) is bounded.
Then, by example 7.11 in Hamilton (1994), equation (1.14) holds.
Further, dVar(ft) p! var(ft) and ^k p! k. From the fact that there
are only continuous functions in the estimator, it follows that
b^
p!   var(ft) 1
 
1
K
KX
k=1
k
0
k
! 1 
1
K
KX
k=1
k
0
k+ 0
!
b^
p!   var(ft) 1 = b:
In other words, b^ is a consistent estimator for b. However, the num-
ber of assets and the number of time steps have to converge to innity
for this estimator to be consistent.
Article 2
Firm Life Cycles under
Financial Constraints
and Additive Shocks
Joint work with Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe
Abstract: This paper presents a simple model of the rm life cycle that
captures several stylized economic and nancial features which usually require
considerably more demanding approaches. We study the optimal capital accu-
mulation policy of a nancially constrained rm whose revenue is subject to an
additive shock. Earnings can be paid as dividends or reinvested with the goal
to maximize shareholder value. In our model, the optimal policy of rms is to
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reinvest earnings (rather than paying dividends) when small, hold precautionary
savings, and grow larger than is socially optimal. Smaller rms also have a higher
bankruptcy risk and a more volatile market value than larger rms. We observe
the leverage eect and excess returns of value stocks. In the presence of business
cycles, investment and initial public oerings are pro-cyclical, the default prob-
ability is counter-cyclical, and monetary policy increases excess capital holdings
but otherwise has a negligible impact.
2.1 Introduction
The theory of the rm life cycle, starting with the seminal contribu-
tion by Mueller (1972), continues to attract the interest of economists
and nance researchers. At the heart of economic contributions to
this theory is that a rm's investment opportunities and, therefore,
its investment policy changes over time: young rms are innova-
tive with high growth potential but lack capital; mature companies
have few options for growth, face diseconomies of scale but are well
capitalized.1 From a nancial perspective, the rm life cycle can
be summarized as follows. Small rms are young, pay low (if any)
dividends, grow quickly and have a high risk of bankruptcy while
large companies are older, pay high dividends, barely grow and have
a lower risk of default. Empirical support for the characterization
of the life cycle through rms' dividend payments is given, e.g., by
Fazzari et al. (1988), Fama and French (2001), Grullon et al. (2002)
and DeAngelo et al. (2006). The growth/default perspective is sup-
1Growth of a rm can take many dierent forms, for instance, development
of new products or improvement in production eciency through R&D, entering
new markets, mergers and acquisitions to foster vertical or horizontal integration
and many others.
2.1. INTRODUCTION 2-3
ported by the ndings of Hall (1987), Evans (1987a,b), Dunne et al.
(1989) and Dhawan (2001).
Implications of nancing constraints on the relation between the
rm size and growth rates, default probabilities, and Tobin's q are
discussed in Cooley and Quadrini (2001) who nd that all of these
measures are decreasing in the size of the rm. Other nancial char-
acteristics related to the size of the rm (and thus to the life cy-
cle) are empirical observations on pro-cyclical investment behavior
(Barro (1990)) and defaults (Chava and Jarrow (2004), Vassalou and
Xing (2004)) and Chen (2010)).
This paper illustrates that these stylized empirical facts can be
obtained in a very simple, neoclassical model where growth is purely
driven by capital accumulation. To this end, we study the optimal
dividend-investment policy of a rm whose earnings are subject to
uctuations in the output market (which acts as an additive shock to
production). The rm does not have access to outside nance and
growth has to be `organic,' only accumulated capital can serve as
a cushion against exogenous shocks. Most eects are present under
i.i.d. shocks, but we also consider the impact of the business cycle (in
particular its depth and duration as well as central bank's interest
rate policies) on the nancially constrained rm's optimal behavior.
The role of nancing constraints in the behavior of the rm and
its implications for the dividend policy has been studied, e.g., by
Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004),
and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) whose results imply that credit
restrictions can give rise to the rm life cycle.2 Financing constraints
2Financial constraints arise for a number of reasons, for instance, information
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force companies to save in order to ensure access to funding if and
when needed. When companies do access their savings, however,
is not obvious. Almeida et al. (2004) conclude that rms mostly
save in times of high cash ows which enables them to realize invest-
ment opportunities in leaner times. Riddick and Whited (2009), in
contrast, nd that it is prot-maximizing to reduce savings in good
times because these oer more protable investment opportunities.
In our model, the rm does not have access to any outside nancing
other than the initial investment by the owner; all growth has to
be organic. Furthermore, nancial market features as the value pre-
mium and the leverage eect can be explained by our model. This
is in line with simulation results from Livdan et al. (2009).
Economics has produced a wealth of models explaining the rm
life cycle of which only a few classical contributions are cited here.
Mueller and Tilton (1969) discuss a technological-development cycle
where many rms enter a new market and heavily invest in R&D
which makes it more dicult for other newcomers to enter. Eventu-
ally technological progress slows and production techniques become
standardized|the industry has matured and late entrants face large
capital requirements. Therefore companies are growing fast (and
face high risks of default) when they are young but their growth rate
decreases over time. A similar dynamics occurs over the life cycle of
a product, see, e.g., Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper (1996). A
new product market draws in many entrants, reducing protability
and forcing exits by all but those who have the lowest R&D costs per
asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Greenwald et al. (1984), and Myers and
Majluf (1984)) or agency conicts (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and
Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986)).
2.1. INTRODUCTION 2-5
produced unit|typically large companies. Other approaches stress
the role of learning in rms' eort to determine their actual cost func-
tions as, e.g., in the seminal contribution by Jovanovic (1982). In our
model, there is only one rm with a xed (and known) neoclassical
production function whose earnings are subject to an additive shock
and nancial constraints.
In departure to the majority of literature as for example Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) this paper uses additive shocks to the produc-
tion function. This results in a non-concave value function and that
companies may endogenously decide on the exit from the market
(since a negative shock could wipe out the whole company, it can
make sense to sell almost all assets, if a number of negative shocks
are expected in future). Furthermore, additive shocks together with
the nancing constraint bring with them a surprising wealth of styl-
ized facts in our simple model as shown in the literature discussion in
the previous paragraphs.3 An improvement to the existing literature
is in that respect that the rm life-cycle and nancial market eects
as the value and the leverage eect can be explained in one model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2
introduces the model. Section 2.3 numerically analyzes the rm's
optimal dividend-investment policy for i.i.d. shocks and the resulting
dynamic. Section 2.4 studies the impact of the business cycle on
rms' behavior. Section 2.5 briey looks into the eects of a central
3Our model is much simpler than the one of Cooley and Quadrini (2001),
because no outside nancing is allowed. This reduces the number of variables in
the optimization problem as well as the total number of parameters in the model
drastically. Due to the additive shocks on the other hand, the model gains more
complexity.
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bank's interest rate policy. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
We consider the optimal dividend-investment policy of a rm whose
production is subject to exogenous shocks which entails random vari-
ations in earnings. The rm has no access to outside capital and
growth has to be organic. The rm can either retain prots to aug-
ment its capital stock, pay dividends to its owners, or combine both
measures. The dividend payment stream is chosen such that its ex-
pected net present value is maximized. We consider the optimal
dividend-investment policy of a rm whose production is subject to
exogenous shocks which entails random variations in earnings. The
rm has no access to outside capital and growth has to be organic.
The rm can either retain prots to augment its capital stock, pay
dividends to its owners, or combine both measures. The dividend
payment stream is chosen such that its expected net present value is
maximized. We assume that there are no agency conicts between
owner and management.
The rm's decision problem. Time is discrete with an innite
horizon, t = 0; 1; :::. The shock s 2 S := fS1; :::; Sng, Si 2 R for i =
1; :::; n, follows a stationary time-homogeneous Markov process with
transition probabilities s~s, s; ~s 2 S. Given a state s, Es() denotes
the conditional expectation. We will study the rm's dividend policy
rst for an i.i.d. process (where s~s does not depend on s), and then
for a proper Markov process (as a model of the business cycle).
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The net production function f(k; s) is assumed to be non-negative,
continuous and bounded. We will further assume that the output
f(k; s) is increasing in the capital input investment) k and decreas-
ing in the shock s. Our analysis will focus on production functions
of the form
f(k; s) = maxfg(k)  s; 0g; (2.1)
with a strictly concave function g(k). If the output is zero (which
happens when a shock of suciently large magnitude occurs), the
rm is declared bankrupt because its output will remain zero in all
future periods owing to a lack of access to outside nance.
The state of the shock is revealed after the capital is invested.
Future payments are discounted with the discount factor  2 (0; 1).
The rm solves the following optimization problem for a given pair
(y0; s0) 2 R+  S of initial capital and initial state of the shock:
V (y0; s0) := sup
(dt)t0
Es0
1X
t=0
tdt (2.2)
subject to
yt+1 = f(kt; st+1) and 0  dt  yt with kt := yt   dt: (2.3)
Wasting capital is not optimal because the objective function is
strictly increasing in each dt. Therefore, the budget constraint in
(2.3) is written as an equality. The above specication allows rms
to pay out all initial capital as dividends in the rst period without
ever producing. The Bellman equation for the value of the optimiza-
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tion problem (2.2) is given by
V (y; s) = sup
0dy
 
d+ 
X
~s2S
s~sV (f(y   d; ~s); ~s)
!
: (2.4)
Standard results (Stokey et al. (1989, Chapter 9)) ensure that
there exists a unique solution V (y; s) and a process (dt)t0 attaining
the supremum in the optimization problem (2.2){(2.3). Indeed, the
supremum can be replaced by a maximum in (2.4). However, as the
production function k 7! f(k; s) is not necessarily concave, unique-
ness of the optimal path cannot be guaranteed. We will choose the
highest current dividend payment at which the maximum of the value
function is attained. This selection rule leads to a unique dividend-
investment policy.
Numerical approximation method. The numerical approxi-
mation of the value function uses the fact that the sequence
Vn+1(y; s) := max
0dy
(d+ EsVn(f(y   d; ~s); ~s)) (2.5)
converges to the solution to (2.4), thanks to Blackwell's sucient
conditions for a contraction, see, e.g., Stokey et al. (1989, Theorem
9.6). The rm's optimal policy is determined numerically by solving
the right-hand side of (2.5) for a given approximation of the value
function. It suces to approximate the value V (y; s) on a set [0; y]S
with y suciently large because the net production function f and
the set of shocks are bounded.
A rm without nancing constraint. A useful benchmark is
obtained by removing the restriction on access to outside nancing.
2.2. THE MODEL 2-9
Suppose the rm can borrow and lend at an interest rate r > 0. The
discount rate is  = 1=(1+ r). The optimization problem of the rm
is unchanged but the budget constraint (2.3) is
yt+1 = f(yt dt+bt (1+r)bt 1; st+1); and 0  dt  yt+bt (1+r)bt 1
with b 1 = 0. The principal amount bt 1 borrowed at time t   1
and the interest rbt 1 need to be repaid at time t. As debt can be
rolled over, one has to assume that supt Ebt < 1 to exclude Ponzi
schemes.
The optimal investment k(s), which depends only on the current
state s, is determined by Es[f 0(k(s); ~s)] = 1 + r. Suppose that the
production function is given by (2.1). Then, investing the capital k,
the probability that there is no output in the current period is given
by:
zs(k) =
X
f~s2S: g(k)~sg
s~s:
The optimal investment k(s) is given by the solution to:
k = (g0) 1

1 + r
1  zs(k)

: (2.6)
If a solution k(s) exists, the rm will operate forever and default
will not happen because of access to outside nancing in each period.
Otherwise, the rm will not be established since its net present value
would be negative. The additive shock is an extreme assumption,
since the rm is hidden by the shock independent, if it is doing
something or not. Especially the rm cannot decide to do nothing
to be not exposed to the shock. The advantage of this assumption is
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that small rms are exposed to a relatively larger risk within a very
simple structure.
Parameter values and production function. We consider a
Cobb{Douglas type production function with negative shocks:
f(k; s) = maxfk   k   s; 0g; (2.7)
where  > 0, 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1. The values are set to
 = 0:8;  = 0:95;  = 2:0; and  = 0:1; (2.8)
ensuring that small companies do not grow too fast ( is close to one
to reduce marginal productivity for small capital stocks) and that
rms with little capital are worth founding ( is suciently large to
avoid the optimality of paying all capital as dividends, without ever
producing). Our focus is on the stylized features of the dynamics;
no attempt is made to calibrate this simple model.
2.3 Optimal policy of the rm under i.i.d.
shocks
The optimal dividend-investment policy of the rm is rst studied
for i.i.d. shocks. The production shock st 2 fS1; S2g with S1 = 0 and
S2 = 2 is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and assigns
the same probability to each state, 1 = 2 = 0:5 (all transition
probabilities s~s = 0:5). The current state of the shock has no
impact on the distribution of the next state and the value function is
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independent of s. The model parameters are dened in (2.7){(2.8).
In state S1, production is standard Cobb{Douglas, with sustainable
positive levels of capital stock. The state S2, however, has a severe
impact on the rm's capital and will deplete, after a long enough
run, any amount of capital.
The value function is approximated numerically on a grid of
20,000 equidistant points in the interval [0; y], y = 20:0. This set
is forward invariant under the dynamics because maxs2S f(y; s) =
f(y; 0) < y, i.e., no rm will accumulate more capital than y. The
numerical iteration (2.5) is performed until two subsequent functions
are closer than 10 4 in the supremum norm kV k = sup0yy jV (y)j.
From this approximation of the value function, we extract the op-
timal policy using the right-hand side of (2.5) subject to choosing
the highest current dividend payment if the optimal decision is not
unique. No numerical instabilities were encountered.
2.3.1 Dynamics
The rm's optimal investment, optimal dividend payment and the
value function for given capital stocks are depicted in Figures 2.1(a)-
2.1(c). The properties of each of these functions and their economic
and nancial implications are discussed in turn and compared with
stylized empirical ndings.
Value function. The value function, Figure 2.1(a), is not con-
cave and exhibits kinks. This is a consequence of the non-smoothness
of the production function for the shock s = S2 because the risk
of bankruptcy (i.e., the loss of the entire capital) does not depend
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continuously on the capital stock but rather jumps at levels of the
capital stock which are exactly depleted when a run of n negative
shocks prevails. Increasing capital at any of these critical levels by an
arbitrarily small amount, drastically reduces the (n-run) bankruptcy
risk. Although non-smoothness of the value function seems to have
no eect on the optimal dividend policy, Section 2.3.3 shows that
this is not true in general.
Dividend and investment policy. The optimal investment
and dividend policy are depicted in Figures 2.1(b) and (c). The
rm's policy is simple: below a certain capital level, all earnings are
reinvested and no dividends are paid. If the output exceeds this
threshold, then the capital stock is held constant and all `excess
earnings' are disbursed to the owners.
The threshold capital stock above which dividend payments are
made is given by k = 5:48. This level is about 6.4% higher than
the optimal (constant) investments of 5.15 which would be employed
by a rm without nancing constraints in every period. The higher
capital stock reduces bankruptcy risk and allows the rm to rebuild
its capital faster and resume dividend payments earlier, after the
occurrence of the shock S2. The rm's policy can be interpreted as
precautionary savings which enable the rm to (temporarily) mit-
igate the eect of the shock. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) nd the
same investment policy in a model with default costs, costs of raising
new capital and shocks that are proportional to the rm's output.
In a continuous time setup with nancial constraints and irreversible
investment Holt (2003) nds a similar investment policy: rms try
to reach a certain optimal capital level, if the company is above that
level it stops investing (in their setup the capital is irreversible, i.e.
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(c) Optimal dividend payment.
Figure 2.1: Value function V (yt), optimal investment kt and optimal
dividend payment dt as a function of the initial capital stock yt.
Cobb{Douglas production function (2.7) with parameters (2.8) and
uniformly distributed i.i.d. shock with values S1 = 0 and S2 = 2.
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it cannot shrink).
In our model rms invest more than socially optimal and their
optimal size is larger than if they had access to outside nance.
Unlike in models with perfect capital markets such as Modigliani and
Miller (1958) (where dividend payments can be oset by renancing),
the dividend policy matters and precautionary savings are optimal.
The optimal policy of the rm matches empirical observations on
retained earnings. Fazzari et al. (1988) nd that rms with a value
below 10 million dollars (small rms) have a retention ratio of 79%,
whereas rms with a value over one billion have a ratio of 52%, i.e.,
smaller rms rely more on internal funding of investments. Guiso
(1998), however, nds that size can be a poor proxy for measuring
credit constraints.
Precautionary savings are, in practice, often related to holding
more liquid assets, Opler et al. (1999). Our model makes no distinc-
tion between liquid and illiquid assets but the rm holds more assets
than if it were unconstrained. Further evidence of precautionary
savings is presented in Almeida et al. (2004) who nd that compa-
nies save a larger proportion of their cash ow in good times (when
the cash ow is high) in order to realize investment opportunities
in times with low cash ows. This behavior closely resembles the
precautionary savings observed in our model where the rm requires
capital to survive negative shocks.
The rm's optimal dividend policy implies that larger compa-
nies pay more dividends and very small companies do not pay any.
Fazzari et al. (1988) nd that, in 1970, low dividend-paying rms
were, on average, more than 12 times smaller than the high dividend-
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paying rms and that rms with low dividends, investments relative
to capital are almost 50% higher than for high dividend payers. More
recent ndings by Fama and French (2001), and Grullon et al. (2002)
are similar. According to DeAngelo et al. (2006), in 2003, only 18.9%
of the companies paid any dividends.
Growth rates and default. The risk of default cannot be elim-
inated by the rm this parametrization, though the more capital that
a company has, the longer it can survive. Therefore, the likelihood
of default decreases with rm size, see Table 2.1. If a rm's capital is
below 1:0671, it will default if the shock S2 = 2 occurs. This default
occurs independently of the investment decision because the shock
will destroy the rm's entire capital within one period. A larger rm
will survive longer.
The rm invests all of its capital if y0  k = 5:48. For y0 > k,
the rm pays its owners the amount y0   k and invests k. As
long as yt < k
, the rm aims to accumulate more capital. The
rm grows if and only if the shock is S1 = 0. When the shock S2
occurs, the rm shrinks and continues with a lower capital stock in
the subsequent period. A rm with capital stock of k can survive a
run of 12 shocks of size S2, but it would default after the thirteenth
shock. (The probability of this event is 0:513  0:0122%.) At the
socially optimal capital stock (k = 5:15), the rm would default
earlier.
The relation between dividend payments and rms' growth rate
is quite intricate in our simple model. Small (non-dividend paying)
rms have a high marginal productivity but also a high risk of de-
fault, leading to a low expected growth rate (in the short run). Large
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Current capital y
0.5 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Prob. of default after 1 period 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prob. of default within 5 periods 0.75 0.59 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00
Marginal productivity (g0(y)) 1.74 1.5 1.29 1.18 1.11 1.06
Exp. growth rate of capital (in %) 9.87 -5.00 14.11 17.21 16.57 14.69
Table 2.1: Probability of default over one and ve periods, marginal
productivity, and expected growth rate of the rm's capital for dif-
ferent current capital stocks y.
rms have low marginal productivity and therefore grow slowly, if at
all. Table 2.1 provides data on the expected value of (k1   y0)=y0,
the expected growth rate of the rm size over T = 1 period. (In our
model, positive growth only happens in the absence of the negative
shock S2.) Small as well as large companies experience falling growth
rates with increasing size. The growth rate of smaller rms is more
volatile because the the shock is independent of rm size; small rms
are riskier than large rms.
Hall (1987), Evans (1987a,b) and Dhawan (2001) provide evi-
dence, based on US manufacturing rm data, that small rms grow
quicker, are more productive and riskier than larger rms. Models
with nancing constraints typically arrive at the same result, see, for
example, Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). Beside that young and
small rms grow quicker as Huynh and Petrunia (2010) showed, if
the debt to asset ratio is low. I.e. deep pockets remove nancial con-
straints and allow a faster growth. This is in line with our model, re-
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ducing nancial constraints by providing more capital, increases the
value of constraint rms massively. This can be seen especially by
the steepness of the value function in gure 2.1(a) for small strongly
constrained rms. The most extreme case is the unconstrained rm,
which immediately jump to a much higher capital level.
Quantifying the eect of the nancing constraint. The
economic impact of the nancing constraint on the rm's capital
stock, compared with the social optimum, is twofold. Young compa-
nies are forced to grow organically and are forced to invest less than
is socially optimal, whereas large companies hold too much capital as
an insurance against bankruptcy risk. The loss to the shareholders
incurred by the lack of outside nance is quantied in Table 2.2.
Current capital y
0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
NPV Organic growth (1) 0.0 1.9 3.5 7.9 11.1 12.9 14.1
Outside nance (2) 9.2 9.7 10.2 11.2 12.2 13.2 14.2
(1) as % of (2) 0.0 19.6 34.3 70.5 91.0 97.3 99.3
Table 2.2: Net present value (NPV) of the rm as a function of the
current capital stock: with and without nancing constraint.
With access to outside nance, ownership of technology has value
even if the rm does not hold capital; its net present value is 9:2.
Increasing the initial capital, increases the value of the rm by the
same amount. Without capital and outside nancing, the rm has
no value. As the initial capital paid by the shareholders increases,
so does the value of the rm that needs to grow organically | but
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the eect is not linear. Small amounts of capital can have a large
impact which is equal to the marginal productivity corrected for the
risk of bankruptcy. The dierence between the value of the rm in
these two scenarios decreases with increasing equity. The nancing
constraint carries a substantial economic cost for smaller rms. This
nding shows a large impact of nancial constraints to the value and
therewith also with the production of the rm. This is in line with the
equilibrium model of Clemens and Heinemann (2010), who showed
in a setup with labor market and intermediate goods calibrated to
US data that tighter nancial constraints lead to substantial losses
in aggregate output and welfare.
2.3.2 Risk/return characteristics
The characteristic of risk and return prole of an investment into
the rm matters, for instance, to the founder of a rm as well as
to the investors when the rm goes public. We study an owner-
entrepreneur who invests the initial capital y0 and will be able to
sell the rm for its net present value V (yT ; sT ) in an IPO after T
periods. (Here we assume that the investors are risk-neutral and the
market is ecient.) The rm follows the optimal dividend policy
described above.
Internal investment. The attractiveness of the initial invest-
ment into the rm can be measured by an average Tobin's q: The
market value divided by the replacement value of the investment
(Tobin (1969)). In our model, Tobin's q is given by V (y)=y, the
net present value divided by the available capital y. This quantity
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describes the gross return to the rm's founder who invests y and
immediately sells the rm for its net present value V (y). Figure 2.2
depicts the relationship between Tobin's q and the initial capital y.
Tobin's q is high for small rms and decreases with rm size
for larger capital stocks, though it is always larger than 1. Firms
with a high Tobin's q reinvest all earnings, whereas those with a
low Tobin's q pay dividends. The scope for expected future income,
which can be realized with retained earnings, gives small rms a
high value relative to its capital. Relative to the socially optimal
size they are too small and the nancing constraint bits particularly
hard. These observations are in lines with ndings by Fazzari et al.
(1988) and Erickson and Whited (2000) who show that constrained
US rms have a higher Tobin's q and that these rms invest more.
These properties also correspond to the simulation results presented
in Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
For intermediate rm sizes, the non-concavity of the value func-
tion (owing to bankruptcy risk) implies a rather complex relationship
which implies that, even in simple models, the relation between size
and Tobin's q is not trivial. This puts into perspective the di-
culties in nding strong empirical relations between Tobin's q and
investment.
Outside investment. The gross return to a stock market in-
vestor who participates in the IPO is measured by the annualized
ratio of the rm's net present value at time T and the ex-dividend
net present value at time 0:
RT (y0; s
T ) =

V (yT (s
T ))
V (y0)  d0
1=T
; (2.9)
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Figure 2.2: Tobin's q, V (y)=y, as a function of the initial capital y
(i.e., the replacement value of the capital before dividend payment).
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where yT (s
T ) is the output in period T , which is determined by the
sequence of shocks sT = (s1; : : : ; sT ) and the rm's optimal dividend
policy. The mean and variance of the return are given by
T (y0) =
X
sT2ST
p(sT )RT (y0; s
T )
and
T (y0)
2 =
X
sT2ST
p(sT )(RT (y0; s
T )  T (y0))2;
where p(sT ) = s1   sT is the probability of observing the sequence
of shocks sT .
Empirical evidence of Whited and Wu (2006) and the simulation
results of Livdan et al. (2009) suggest that, on average, more con-
strained rms have higher returns and higher volatility. In our model
this holds only for very small rms. For example, if T = 5, the initial
capital must be below y0 = 0:902 which gives very unattractive ex-
pected return below T = 0:44317. Indeed, the return-volatility pro-
le improves for investments up to y0 = 3:617 where T = 1:02608
and T = 0:05425. For higher initial investments, the relation be-
tween the expected return and volatility follows the classical mean-
variance diagram.
Leverage eect. As the company does not issue new capital,
the market value of the rm is equal to its equity price and, there-
fore, some observations on equity returns can be made. Figure 2.3(a)
presents the volatility of stock market returns, dened in (2.9), as
a function of the value of the rm (i.e., its market capitalization).
For large rms, volatility decreases with market capitalization. This
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Figure 2.3: Expected gross return T (y0) over T = 5 periods as a
function of the rm's, market value V (y0) (panel (a)) and its market-
to-book ratio V (y0)=y0 (panel (b)). Each point on the graphs corre-
sponds to a particular initial capital stock y0 with y0 = n  10 3, n
an integer and 0:1  y0  k = 5:48.
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eect is reversed for smaller rms with a value below 3:2240. Higher
volatility as a result of falling equity prices, as observed for the large
companies in Figure 2.3(a), is a stylized fact called the leverage ef-
fect. Black (1976) argues that a drop in the value of a company in-
creases its leverage and, therefore, makes it riskier. Christie (1982)
and Schwert (1989) show that volatility is an increasing function of
leverage. The simulation results by Livdan et al. (2009) also show
that nancially constrained rms have a higher systematic risk.
Another possible explanation of the leverage eect is that a per-
manent increase in volatility increases, leads shareholders to demand
a higher average return; therefore, today's price has to fall. This
point is made, e.g., by Pindyck (1984), French et al. (1987), Turner
et al. (1989), Campbell and Hentschel (1992), Wu (2001), Kim et al.
(2004) and Mayeld (2004). Bekaert and Wu (2000) and Bae et al.
(2007) quantify both eects in a model and nd that the second eect
is stronger. Since in the present model there is neither a risk pre-
mium nor leverage, our results show that these eects can be caused
by nancial constraints: A less valuable company becomes riskier
because the likelihood of default increases if there is less capital to
absorb shocks.
Value premium. The book value of a rm is the replacement
value of the assets that the company owns. The market-to-book
value ratio is an indicator of whether the company is a so-called
`growth' company or a `value' company. A growth company (high
market-to-book value) has few assets now, but the market expects
the company to grow quickly and deliver substantial prot in the
future. Value companies (low market-to-book value) already have
many assets today, and their growth expectations are lower. Fig-
2-24 ARTICLE 2. FIRM LIFE CYCLES
ure 2.3(b) illustrates the relation between the market-to-book ratio
and expected returns in our model.
Firms with a low market-to-book value have a high capital stock
but they also have high expected returns. The maximum expected
return of 1:02608 is attained at a market-to-book ratio of 3:40557.
Companies with little initial capital have a high market-to-book
value but low returns and, by and large, the returns increase with
a higher market-to-book ratio (see Figure 2.3(b)). This property is
in line with the empirical ndings by Stattman (1980), Rosenberg
et al. (1985) and Chan et al. (1991). Fama and French (1992, 1998)
and others found (using US and international data) that value stocks
perform better than growth stocks, and that this eect cannot be ex-
plained by market risk factors. It is often argued that the premium
for value stocks (i.e., stocks with a low book-to-market value) reects
other risk factors. In that view, the value premium is an indicator of
the investment opportunities in the economy.4 Our model shows (as
also observed by Livdan et al. (2009)) that these considerations are
not needed if there are nancial constraints. High market-to-book
ratios may just be an indicator for nancially constrained rms that
also face a higher default risk, such that expected returns are lower.
4E.g., Fama and French (1996), Liew and Vassalou (2000), Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004), Brennan et al. (2004), Hahn and Lee (2006) and Petkova
(2006) or, for equilibrium models, Gomes et al. (2003), Zhang (2005) and Lettau
and Wachter (2007).
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2.3.3 Multiple i.i.d. shocks
This section briey studies an extended version of the previous model
where the i.i.d. shocks can take on more than two values. It turns
out that the non-concavity of the value function can indeed entail a
more complex dynamics. For instance, the maximum size of the rm
becomes a function of the initial investment. We assume that one
additional (large) shock S3 = 6 occurs with probability 3 = 0:09
while the two other shocks S1 = 0 and S2 = 2 are assigned equal
probabilities 1 = 2 = (1   3)=2. Figure 2.4 shows the optimal
investment and dividend as a function of the rm's capital.5
The optimal dividend-investment policy diers markedly from
the one obtained in the previous case, displaying several `plateaus'
in Figure 2.4(a). In the present example there are three distinc-
tive plateaus at dierent levels of capital stocks: low (kl = 0:128),
medium (km = 3:766) and high (k

h = 5:283). Each of these plateaus
corresponds to a capital level above which the rm starts paying
dividends. A rm with a capital stock below kl pays out all earn-
ings exceeding kl and maintains this size until the shock S2 or S3
causes it to go bankrupt. The level kh corresponds to the maximum
size to which a rm can grow organically with an initial capital of
yh = 1:739 or more. For a capital level below y

h, the rm size con-
verges to an optimal capital level of kl . If the initial endowment is
on the medium plateau between km and k

m = 4:761, the rm will
pay dividends of y km and shrinks to size km. If there is no negative
5Although the dynamics described below are prevalent in simulations with
several shocks, parameters have to be chosen with a little care to obtain graphs
as neat as those presented here.
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(b) Optimal dividend payment.
Figure 2.4: Optimal investment kt and optimal dividend payment dt
as a function of the rm's capital yt for the case of three i.i.d. shocks.
shock (i.e., S1 = 0 is realized), the company will grow in the next
period from km directly to k

h. Therefore, the eect of the medium
level typically occurs only for one period. A rm of size kh will re-
tain earnings after one shock of size S2, with the aim of reaching its
previous size. If the large shock S3 is realized, however, the capital
stock falls below yh and the rm will not grow to its previous size
but rather shrink to size kl .
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2.4 Business cycles and optimal invest-
ment
The business cycle has a signicant impact on rms' optimal dividend-
investment policies. In this section we aim to study its eect within
the framework of our model. The business cycle is implemented as
exogenous market conditions with a certain degree of persistence,
modeled by a Markov process with two shocks S1 = 0 (boom)
and S2 = 2 (recession) and (symmetric) transition probabilities
11 = 22 = p. The probability of a change of the regime is given by
12 = 21 = 1   p. The higher p, the higher is the persistence of a
state and, thus, the average duration of regimes. The value function
and the optimal policy of the rm will depend on the current state
of the shock.
We are interested in qualitative dierences in the rm's optimal
policy between booms and recessions and, in particular, the eect of
the duration of recessions (measured by p) and the depth (varying
S2) on the rm's optimal policy. The production function and pa-
rameters are given by (2.7){(2.8) and are identical to the case studied
in Section 2.3 (which is obtained by setting p = 0:5).
2.4.1 Optimal dividend-investment policy
The value function V (y; s) and the rm's optimal behavior is de-
rived numerically from (2.5). The simulation results are presented
in Figure 2.5.
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(d) Recession: Optimal investment.
Figure 2.5: The optimal policy of the rm in the two regimes for
dierent degrees of persistence. Firm value V (yt; st) and investment
kt as a function of the capital yt. Cases: p = 0:5 (dotted), p = 0:9
(dashed) and p = 0:99 (solid). Panels (a) and (c): current state
st = S1 = 0 (boom). Panels (b) and (d): current state st = S2 = 2
(recession).
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The dividend policy in a boom is analogous to the i.i.d. case
analyzed in Section 2.3. The rm reinvests all output up to a certain
threshold, above which dividends are paid and the investment is
kept constant. This threshold corresponds to the maximum size of
the rm (i.e., the highest level of investment, which is reached after
several boom periods). The maximum rm size in recessions, which
is unobtainable but optimal for an outside investor, is larger than
that in booms, see Figure 2.5(d).
Persistence p 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99
Expected duration of regime 2 4 10 20 40 100
Maximum size (1) 5.48 6.07 6.18 5.69 5.15 5.15
Excess investment (in %) 6.36 17.77 19.85 10.38 0.00 0.00
Net present y = 1 100 33.6 16.3 10.6 7.2 5.0
value of rm y = 2 100 56.1 25.3 15.8 11.6 8.7
in recession y = 3 100 70.3 35.5 21.4 15.6 12.1
(in % of (1)) y = 4 100 80.2 46.1 27.8 19.3 15.3
y = 5 100 86.1 55.2 34.3 22.7 18.2
Table 2.3: Maximum size of the nancially constrained rm in
a boom and excess investment relative to an unconstrained rm
(which holds capital 5:15 independent of the regime persistence).
Net present value of the rm in the recession, V (y; S2), as a percent-
age of the value in the boom, V (y; S1), for dierent capital y.
Table 2.3 summarizes the impact of the persistence of regimes on
the maximum rm size in booms and the dierence in the rm value
between booms and recessions (the rm's future prospects depend on
the current regime and thus its valuation). The interpretation of the
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data on the maximum rm size is as follows. First, a rm without
access to outside nancing aims to accumulate excess capital as long
as the regime persistence is not too high. The relationship between
the duration of regimes and the maximum size is inverse U-shaped.
The maximum amount of excess capital held is considerable (up to
20%). These precautionary savings prevent (or, at least, postpone)
bankruptcy during a subsequent recession. This benet decreases
with the average duration of recessions which lowers the incentive to
hold capital in excess of the socially optimal level.
The capital stock of the rms in our model is growing in good
states (the companies invest) and decreasing in recessions. Barro
(1990), using aggregated US investment data, shows that invest-
ment is pro-cyclical. Defaults in our model happen only in a reces-
sion which mimics the empirical fact that default probabilities are
larger in periods of falling stock prices (Vassalou and Xing (2004) and
Chava and Jarrow (2004)) which coincide with falling GDP (Chen
(2010)).
The eect of regime duration on the variation of the rm value
between booms and recessions is as follows, see Table 2.3. Smaller
rms are harder hit by a recession. Whereas a large company will
only lose about one-third of its value when entering a recession that
lasts on average 10 periods, a small rm will see its value decline to
16:3%. This is caused by the low chances of survival in a persistent
recession when the rm has little capital.
It is more attractive for an outside investor to invest during
booms (since the same amount of capital y delivers a higher value
V (y; S0) > V (y; S1)), implying that new companies will be founded
2.4. BUSINESS CYCLES AND OPTIMAL INVESTMENT 2-31
mainly during booms. This feature matches the waves of IPOs docu-
mented by Ibbotson and Jae (1975) and Pastor and Veronesi (2005)
who show that IPOs are more frequent in rising stock markets. A
pro-cyclical pattern of rms' output, entry and exit is also found in
the computational study by Delli Gatti et al. (2003). In their model
rms face quadratic adjustment cost of capital and exogenously spec-
ied dividends. Companies default, if they are not able to pay the
interest on their debts.
2.4.2 Eect of the depth of recession
We next study the eect of the depth of the recession on the rm's
optimal dividend-investment policy. The depth is given by the size
of the shock S2 which will be varied in what follows (we set p = 0:9
and S1 = 0).
Bankruptcy eventually happens irrespective of the rm's policy if
the shock is larger then the threshold S2 > 1:79. For a smaller shock
(S2  1:79), there are sustainable levels of capital, i.e., f(k; S2)  k.
The size of the shock aects the rm's behavior during recessions as
well as booms. Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of the rm's capital
stock over time during a recession lasting ve periods with the depth
of the recession as a parameter. We assume that the rm enters the
recession with the maximum capital level that it would attain in a
boom.
The maximum size of the rm depends on the depth of the reces-
sion, as shown in Figure 2.6 (a). A company survives a recession of
arbitrary length as long as its capital stock k is sustainable in a reces-
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Figure 2.6: Capital stock as a function of the depth of the recession
(size of shock S2). Long-run capital stock in boom (a). Capital stock
after being in recession for one, two and ve periods: (b), (c) and
(d). The rm enters the recession with the capital stock (a). Capital
stocks above the dashed line are sustainable in a recession; capital
stocks below the dotted line lead to bankruptcy if the next period is
a recession.
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sion. The dashed lines in Figure 2.6 indicate the minimum capital
level needed to avoid bankruptcy for a given shock size. Bound-
edness of the production function f implies that, for large shocks,
bankruptcy is unavoidable. For the parametrization (2.7){(2.8), the
maximum size of the shock is 1:79. For larger shocks, it is certain
that the rm will default sooner or later.
For smaller shock sizes, S2  1:76, the rm accumulates capital
up to the socially optimal level of 5:15 and, at this level, does not
face any risk of bankruptcy. If the shock S2 is larger, the rm holds
more capital in booms. Holding this `excess' capital reduces the risk
of bankruptcy by postponing eventual bankruptcy during a recession
because the rm has a capital buer. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6
(b){(d) by the `hump' in the graph, which is located at shocks of
size 1:76  S2  2:48. The excess capital held by the rm rst
increases and then decreases with the depth of the recession. These
precautionary savings are optimal because additional capital helps to
postpone bankruptcy by many periods if the shock is just above the
threshold 1:76. As the shock becomes larger, more excess capital is
required to obtain the same benet. At some shock size (here 2:12),
the costs start to outweigh the benet, leading to lower precautionary
savings.
If the shock size S2 is larger than 2:48, the rm does not hold any
excess capital in booms but rather chooses to accumulate capital up
to the socially optimal level. When entering a recession, the rm pays
out almost all of its remaining capital and keeps only a very small
amount, which ensures survival only if a boom follows in the next
period. Without instantaneous recovery, the rm will be bankrupt.
If shocks are even more extreme (such that they would lead to the
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destruction of all of the rm's capital in one period of recession), the
maximum size of the rm is 3:18. The inability to survive recessions
induces rms to limit their size in the boom phase below the socially
optimal one. This optimal behavior is evidenced as the downward
step observed in Figure 2.6 (a) (and, although less visibly, in panel
(b)).
2.5 Optimal policy of the central bank
We nally study the impact of the interest rate set by a central bank
in response to prevailing economic conditions. The central bank is
not able to anticipate the regime prevailing in the next period, but
has to choose the interest rate r(st) as a function of the currently
observed state st. We denote by r1 := r(S1) resp. r2 := r(S2) the
interest rate set in a boom resp. recession. (The policy will always
lag the state of the economy by one period). We further assume that
there is a given average interest rate r that the bank has to meet.
In the symmetric case where, on average, booms and recessions last
for the same number of periods, this condition can be written as
(1 + r1)(1 + r2) = (1 + r
)2. We will use the same specication of
parameters as in Section 2.4 and set the persistence of regimes to
p = 0:9. The interest rate r =  1   1  5:26%. We are interested
in the central bank's optimal policy under these constraints.
The rm's decision problem is analogous to (2.2), with the dis-
count factor t replaced by:
t(st 1) :=
1
1 + r(s0)
 :::  1
1 + r(st 1)
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for t  1. Since the rm cannot hold debt, the interest rate policy has
an impact on the rm's optimal decision only through the discount
rate.
All results on the existence of the optimal dividend-investment
policy and the value function remain valid. Table 2.4 summarizes
the eect of the interest rate policy on the nancially constrained
rm's decisions.
Standard policy const. Non-standard policy
Boom interest rate r1 (in %) 8.26 7.26 6.26 5.26 4.26 3.26 2.26
Recession interest rate r2 (in %) 2.34 3.30 4.27 5.26 6.27 7.30 8.35
Constrained rm
Maximum size in boom (1) 6.24 6.21 6.19 6.18 6.28 6.27 6.27
Minimum size in recession 1.54 1.40 1.24 1.10 1.07 1.07 1.07
Unconstrained rm
Optimal capital in boom (4) 4.65 4.81 4.98 5.15 5.34 5.53 5.73
Difference (1) and (4) (in %) 34.08 29.11 24.37 19.85 17.64 13.37 9.34
Table 2.4: Impact of the central bank's interest rate policy on the
size and market value of nancially constrained rms in booms and
recessions. Capital stocks of an unconstrained rm is provided as a
benchmark.
The maximum size of the rm varies with the interest rate policy.
The eect is quite unexpected because the maximum size of the
rm increases with a non-constant policy irrespectively whether the
`boom interest rate' is increased or decreased. A higher interest rate
during booms leads to stronger discounting of future boom dividend
payments but lower discounting of payments during recessions. This
makes precautionary savings more attractive because it enables the
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rm to survive longer in a recession. On the other hand, a higher
interest rate in recessions (a rather unorthodox policy) has the eect
that payments made during a recession is valued more by the owners
of the rm than postponing it because of the higher discounting.
This induces the rms to accumulate more capital in booms and pay
high dividends in recessions, entailing an extremely high bankruptcy
risk. The excess capital stock (last row in Table 2.4) held by the
nancially constrained rms in good times (booms) is increasing the
lower the interest rate is set in recessions.
The minimum size (dened here as smallest the capital stock at
which the rm chooses to continue operations in a recession rather
than paying out almost all remaining capital) increases when the
recession interest rate decreases. The eect of this standard interest
rate policy, however, is driven by the high boom interest rate. In a
recession the rm does not pay any dividends, their payment is only
resumed in a boom which makes the capital holdings at the end of
a recession more valuable. The rm therefore holds on to a higher
capital stock in a recession.
Summarizing, the standard policy of low interest rates in reces-
sions gives nancially constrained rms an incentive to retain more of
its earnings in good times (booms) and to stay longer in business in
bad times (recession). In this sense, investments happen in booms
out of precautionary motives. The persistence of regimes plays a
vital role in the rm's decision, in the presence of i.i.d. shocks no
adjustment to the business cycle would occur.
In the theoretical models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), rms with
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limited access to the credit market (due to information asymme-
tries) cannot nance protable investments because of macroeco-
nomic shocks which reduce the value of the rms' collateral. The
presence of this investment pattern is conrmed empirically by Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) and Bernanke et al. (1996). Monetary policy is
found by Cooley and Quadrini (2006) to have a stronger (in terms
of output and debts) impact of nancially constrained small rms.
In our model, in contrast, nancially constrained rms reduce
their investment less than unconstrained rms at the outset of a re-
cession because they accumulated precautionary savings in the pre-
vious boom. However, our results are about a dierent type of rm
(those that do not have any access to credit) and, in addition, rms
face persistent (rather than i.i.d.) shocks. We would argue that pre-
cautionary saving motives of nancially constrained rm are more
important under persistent recession regimes.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper studies the optimal behavior of a nancially constrained
rm in the presence of additive production shocks. The model is one
of pure capital accumulation under i.i.d. as well as Markov (business
cycle) shocks. Several stylized economic and nancial characteristics
of the rm life cycle can be illustrated within this simple model. The
dynamic captures the higher default risk, productivity and volatility
of small rms, the concentration of dividend payments on large rms,
a falling Tobin's q in rm size, the leverage eect, the value premium,
the pro-cyclically investment and rm entries, and counter-cyclical
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default probabilities. We also study the impact of a central bank's
interest policy on rms' precautionary savings and their optimal size.
The approach oers several avenues for future research without
losing much of the simplicity of the model. It would be interesting
to weaken the (extreme) assumption of lack of access to any outside
nance by allowing rms to raise at least some capital from, e.g.,
venture capitalists. The assumption on the risk-neutrality of the
owner-entrepreneur can be replaced by other (neoclassical or behav-
ioral) preferences. One could also study the impact of a proportional
shock in the presence of xed costs rather than imposing an addi-
tive output shock as in our model. Finally, competition of several
rms in an output market (with some stochastic aggregate demand
function) can also be studied in a generalized model.
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Article 3
Market Selection in an
Evolutionary Market
with Nonstationary
Dividends
Abstract: Identifying investment strategies that will survive in the long run is a
main endeavor in the eld of evolutionary nance. The evolutionary perspective
on the nancial market considers rather long time horizons, making the creation
and disappearance of rms a highly relevant factor in determining such strategies.
However, this factor has not been examined in existing research. This paper seeks
to ll the gap in the literature by simulating dividends and investment strategies
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on the basis of initial public oerings (IPOs) and defaults. This paper simulates
the evolution of the wealth shares of various investment strategies in a setup
wherein dividends are nonstationary. The results show that a modied version
of the generalized Kelly rule dominates both dividends and competing investment
strategies. This nding agrees with the existing literature, which suggests that
the generalized Kelly rule has good chances of surviving or even taking over the
entire market in dierent setups. However, the creation and dissolution of a
rm can only be observed once in the life of a company; therefore, using only
a long time series of one company alone is not the most optimal method of
estimating the probability that a rm will default. Instead, the dividend process
must be understood by examining similar companies. This completely alters the
implementation of the generalized Kelly rule compared with the way it is applied
in the existing evolutionary nance literature, even when the dividend processes
of the companies involved are independent of each other.
3.1 Introduction
Financial analysis is based on the rationale that companies with
similar characteristics exhibit a comparable rm value. One possible
explanation for this may be that events that can only be observed
once in the entire life of a company have a tremendous impact on
the future of that company. Examples of such events are the rst
blockbuster product of a biotechnology company, the development
of the iPhone by Apple Inc., or the default of a company. Moreover,
such events can only be studied by examining similar companies.
Further, this paper seeks to demonstrate that, in a market with sev-
eral investment strategies, investors who incorporate cross-sectional
information (i.e., information from other rms) in their investment
decisions perform better than those who do not. In other words, the
share of the total wealth accumulated using the strategies of the for-
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mer increases more quickly than that accrued by those of the latter.
Accordingly, strategies that perform poorly are marginalized in the
long run. Briey, this paper will show that the market selects in-
vestors who use cross-sectional information and that other strategies
disappear in the long term.
The idea that the market selects investors who use all available in-
formation and who act rationally was initially proposed by Friedman
(1953) and Fama (1965). According to these researchers, irrational
investors earn lower returns and disappear in the long run. How-
ever, Long et al. (1990) used a partial equilibrium model to show
that the eects of decisions made by irrational investors on stock
prices cannot always be corrected by rational investors because the
latter are risk averse. In addition, Blume and Easley (1992) proved
that a rational investor who does not maximize a logarithmic utility
function can be driven out of a complete market by some irrational
investors, assuming that every investor has the same savings rate.
For exogenous asset prices, Kelly (1956) developed a theory of max-
imizing expected returns on long-term (nancial) investments. To
do so, the investor has to bet his beliefs. Maximizing the growth
rate as the Kelly rule does is equivalent to maximizing a logarithmic
utility function. Therefore, a slightly irrational investor who almost
maximizes a logarithmic utility function can push a rational investor
who maximizes a nonlogarithmic utility function out of the market
on the basis of the higher growth rate of his wealth as in Blume and
Easley (1992).
Samuelson (1979) argued that individuals should maximize their
utility (and therefore their happiness), regardless of whether they
survive in the market. However, this paper focuses on identifying
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the strategies that survive a market selection process, rather than on
making people happy. Because of the exogenously given savings rate,
the asset allocations in Blume and Easley (1992) are neither Pareto
optimal nor do they have a general equilibrium model. Sandroni
(2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) investigated market selection in
a general equilibrium setting with complete markets, and found that
rational investors survive when all investors have the same discount
rate, but the same does not apply in incomplete markets. These are
addressed in detail by Evstigneev et al. (2006), and Evstigneev et al.
(2008) showed that if all strategies and dividends possess Markov
properties or that dividends are independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.), the generalized Kelly rule will drive all strategies
that depend only on the actual state of the world out of the mar-
ket, given that the initial wealth of the competing strategies is small
enough (this property is called local evolutionary stability). This
is further generalized by Amir et al. (2009b); they found that the
generalized Kelly rule is asymptotically unique among all survival
strategies that depend only on the history of states. This implies
that the Kelly rule has almost surely a strictly positive wealth share
that is independent of the strategy of the other investors. How-
ever, asset prices depend not only on the past states but also on
the strategies of the other investors. Therefore, these results are for
many relevant strategies as for example momentum strategies not
applicable. However, simulation results from Tupak (2009) indicate
that the generalized Kelly rule will dominate, given that the true
parameters of the dividend process are known.1
1The generalized Kelly rule also applies to one-period assets with an arbitrary
dividend process, see Evstigneev et al. (2002), Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2005),
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What types of investment strategies survive if dividends are non-
stationary and assets can be created and dissolved? Econometricians
have long debated whether dividends contain a unit root or follow
a stationary process, and the discussion is still not completely re-
solved.2 Summarizing this debate, the test statistics of the unit root
tests suggest that the hypothesis of a unit root in dividends is more
dicult to maintain than the hypothesis of a unit root in stock prices.
Further, Harris and Tzavalis (2004) have rejected the unit root hy-
pothesis for dividends, and DeJong and Whiteman (1991) have also
found it implausible. Therefore, this paper will concentrate on the
implications of the second market feature, which states that assets
can be created and destroyed. This feature automatically generates a
nonstationary dividend process because many companies, including
large ones that are very stable in the short term, did not exist, say,
200 years ago. To determine strategies that will survive in the long
run, it is therefore important to consider the fact that companies can
disappear and new companies will enter the market.
It is often assumed that dividends are driven by one and the
same process over the entire life of a company. This is a very sim-
plistic assumption: for instance, why should a small startup have the
same risk and expected returns as a large concern? Mueller (1972)
suggested a rm life-cycle: small rms are more protable and face
greater risks than large ones, but the large rms pay greater divi-
dends. This life-cycle is driven by the idea that small rms tend to be
and Amir et al. (2005).
2For arguments surrounding the existence of a unit root in dividends, see
Shiller (1981), Kleidon (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1987), Campbell and Shiller
(1988), DeJong and Whiteman (1991), and Harris and Tzavalis (2004).
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more innovative but have diculties in accessing the credit market
and are therefore unable to pay dividends. Hall (1987) and Evans
(1987a,b) found support for this theory in their work on US man-
ufacturing rms, which led them to conclude that small rms grow
more quickly and are riskier than larger rms. Similarly, Dhawan
(2001) discovered that small US manufacturers are more productive
and riskier than large ones. Fama and French (2001), Grullon et al.
(2002), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006), and DeAngelo et al. (2006)
provided empirical evidence for the life-cycle hypothesis of dividend
policy, which holds that large rms pay more dividends than small,
growing companies. In addition to the possibility of default and the
constructible and destructible nature of rms, this paper will con-
sider the fact that small rms with small dividend payments may
become large rms with high dividend payments.
The main aim of this paper is to nd a surviving strategy for
nonstationary dividends modeled on the creation and destruction of
companies. Since the generalized Kelly rule is not feasible in this
setup, the adopted strategy ensures that funds that are invested into
a company are proportional to the expected net present value (NPV)
of that companys dividends. This paper makes several observations.
First, the NPV-strategy is able to dominate the markets in simula-
tions; this indicates that the results from the innitely lived assets
seem to generalize to this setup. Second, many observations are
required if the parameters of the process and the portfolio weights
have to be estimated from past observations of the dividends. If
past observations of dividends are lacking, a generalized Kelly rule
with estimated parameters can be driven out of the market using
simple strategies. This conrms the theoretical ndings pertaining
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to innitely lived assets obtained by Amir et al. (2009a) and the sim-
ulation ndings for stationary dividends obtained by Tupak (2009).
Third, if a wrong dividend process is assumed, the optimal Kelly
rule can produce worse results than a nave strategy that invests the
same amount in each asset. This is shown in a case were the investor
assumed the dividends to be i.i.d.,3 while in reality, the dividends
followed a nonstationary process.
Section 3.2 provides empirical evidence that the creation and dis-
appearance of companies is an important factor in the dividend pro-
cess and discusses further stylized facts. Section 3.3 presents a simple
and minimalist dividend model that conforms to the literature dis-
cussed and the empirical evidence presented herein. Section 3.4
describes the market selection model in which the investment strate-
gies detailed in Section 3.5 will compete. Section 3.6 simulates some
models and Section 3.7 summarizes the papers ndings.
3.2 Empirical evidence on the birth, death,
and dividends of companies
The present section motivates the assumptions for the dividend pro-
cess described in the next section. This section mainly shows that,
over the last 40 years, many new rms have been founded and are
default, a fact that is often neglected in evolutionary nance. Fur-
thermore, dividend payments are largely issued from a small number
3This assumption was used in the simulations of Hens et al. (2002), Hens and
Schenk-Hoppe (2004), and Tupak (2009).
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of companies, and the percentages of dividends paid by dierent sec-
tors change over time. All of this demonstrates that dividends are
highly nonstationary.
To illustrate these points, a sample of 25,272 active and inactive
North American companies that are listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or the
NASDAQ Stock Market is used. The data have been obtained from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and they are for
the period 1973 through 2009. The starting date of 1973 was chosen
because that is the earliest year from which AMEX and NASDAQ
data are available. A company is considered active as long as it is
listed on a certain stock exchange. Within this period, the number of
active companies varies from 5,267 to 9,843 per year; the average is
7,138 companies per year. The large dierence between the number
of active companies per year and the number of active and inactive
companies indicates that many rms were newly founded and that
a large number of companies disappeared.
A company is active for an average time period of 10.51 years,
and the median is lower: eight years. Figure 3.1 shows the number
of companies that remain in the sample for any given number of
years. Approximately a quarter of all rms were in the sample for
less than four years, thus making it extremely dicult to determine
the value of an asset on the basis of its past dividends. Therefore,
cross-sectional information may be helpful in ascertaining the value
and risk and therefore also the optimal amounts of investment in
such assets.
The largest part of the variation in the number of active rms
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Figure 3.1: Number of years a company was in the sample (CRSP
data from 1973 to 2009).
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Year Active Mergers Liquidation Dropped
1973 5,954 103 5 354
1974 5,558 99 11 168
1975 5,398 83 10 80
1976 5,415 101 17 53
1977 5,390 155 18 61
1978 5,344 191 11 70
1979 5,267 209 16 51
1980 5,431 164 24 83
1981 5,794 155 15 88
1982 6,008 172 21 159
1983 6,606 173 11 164
1984 6,862 210 13 229
1985 6,982 248 16 325
1986 7,375 225 26 319
1987 7,642 185 5 225
1988 7,655 352 12 312
1989 7,390 273 13 318
1990 7,218 197 9 339
1991 7,251 119 12 367
1992 7,538 135 9 380
1993 8,108 177 3 170
1994 8,676 279 3 198
1995 9,055 358 9 233
1996 9,608 437 10 174
1997 9,843 511 7 255
1998 9,695 603 5 422
1999 9,374 613 11 394
2000 9,055 631 11 326
2001 8,337 463 7 473
2002 7,653 259 17 390
2003 7,228 257 11 297
2004 7,064 265 17 147
2005 7,043 268 7 162
2006 6,971 312 7 123
2007 7,000 392 8 184
2008 6,563 250 22 230
2009 6,237 158 36 267
Total 9,782 465 8,590
Table 3.1: Active companies (at the end of the year) and reasons for
delisting (CRSP data from 1973 to 2009)
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can be explained by mergers and acquisitions (see Table 3.1). Of
the 18,837 delistings reported by the CRSP from 1973 to 2009, a
total of 9,782 are attributable to this source. The next most impor-
tant reason for deletion is being dropped from the stock exchange.
The number of dropped companies is much higher than the num-
ber of liquidated companies, and this indicates that the big stock
exchanges delist companies with nancial problems before the worst
happens. Table 3.2 provides detailed reasons for dropping the com-
panies: 1,282 companies were delisted because of insucient capital,
930 because their price was too low, 647 because of insolvency, and
982 because they did not pay exchange fees. Therefore, the pro-
portion of defaulting companies accounts for at least 12.5% of all
companies, based on a time period of 36 years. The number of new
companies is also signicant: 19,318 such companies emerged dur-
ing the period under study, working out to an average of 536.6 per
year. These gures plainly demonstrate that long-run investment
strategies should not neglect the fact that rms have nite lives.
Neither the numbers of delisted companies nor the reasons these
companies were delisted are constant over time (see Table 3.1). Typ-
ically, everything happens in waves. For example, many new com-
panies were founded between 1991 and 1997, and a merger wave
occurred from 1996 to 2001. Between 1998 and 2004, the number
of companies fell and the number of liquidations increased tremen-
dously, and this phenomenon was repeated in 2008 and 2009. Due to
this cyclical pattern, the number of companies also moves in waves.
These ndings correspond with the initial public oering (IPO) waves
discovered by Ibbotson and Jae (1975), the procyclical behavior of
IPOs noted by Pastor and Veronesi (2005), and the countercycli-
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Reason for Dropping Firms
Issue stopped trading on current exchange{reason unavailable 965
Issue transferred from current exchange to Mutual Funds 18
Issue transferred from current exchange to Boston Exchange 33
Issue transferred from current exchange to Midwest Exchange 2
Issue transferred from current exchange to Pacic Stock Exchange 17
Issue transferred from current exchange to Philadelphia Stock Ex-
change
3
Issue transferred from current exchange to Toronto Stock Exchange 3
Issue began trading over the counter 375
Delisted by current exchange{insucient number of market makers 464
Delisted by current exchange{insucient number of shareholders 170
Delisted by current exchange{price fell below acceptable level 930
Delisted by current exchange{insucient capital, surplus, and/or eq-
uity
1,282
Delisted by current exchange{insucient (or noncompliance with
rules of) oat or assets
707
Delisted by current exchange{company request (no reason given) 512
Delisted by current exchange{company request (deregistration owing
to going private)
81
Delisted by current exchange{bankruptcy (declared insolvent) 647
Delisted by current exchange{company request (oer rescinded and
issue withdrawn by underwriter)
15
Delisted by current exchange{delinquent in ling and nonpayment of
fees
982
Delisted by current exchange{failure to register under Section 12G of
the Securities Exchange Act
112
Delisted by current exchange{failure to meet exception or equity re-
quirements
167
Delisted by current exchange{denied temporary exception require-
ment
10
Delisted by current exchange{does not meet exchanges nancial guide-
lines for continued listing
867
Delisted by current exchange{protection of investors and the public
interest
137
Delisted by current exchange{corporate governance violation 13
Conversion of a closed-end investment company to an open-end in-
vestment company
47
Delisted by current exchange{required by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC)
31
Table 3.2: Reasons that companies were dropped from their exchange
(CRSP data from 1973 to 2009)
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cal behavior of default probabilities observed in Vassalou and Xing
(2004), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Chen (2010).
To aggregate dividends data from the CRSP, the number of out-
standing shares on the day before the ex-distribution date must be
multiplied by the dividend per share and then aggregated over one
calendar year. For these calculations, only cash dividends were taken
into account (i.e., subscription rights etc. were excluded from the
estimations). Figure 3.2 aggregates the dividends by sector, and
Figure 3.2(b) shows the relative weight of dividends being paid by
dierent sectors. Until 2007, the dividends paid by the nancial sec-
tor increased at a faster rate than those paid by the manufacturing
industry and the transport and telecommunication sector. After the
nancial crisis in 2008, the dividends of the nancial sector reduced
drastically. This reveals persistent shifts in the relative weight of
dividends being paid by dierent sectors. Such shifts are quite natu-
ral; the railroad and textile industries, for instance, were much more
important one hundred years ago than they are today. Long-term
shifts are incompatible with the assumption of i.i.d. dividend shares
of the dierent sectors (or companies), and this assumption has often
been made by parts of the evolutionary nance literature.
No dividends were paid in 57.2% of all company years, which
are dened as the years during which a company is active. In 5.5%
of all company years, dividends increased from zero to a positive
amount and in 5.3% of the years, dividends fell to zero. This in-
dicates that large variations in dividends are a very characteristic
feature of dividend time series. Furthermore, the top 5% of dividend
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dividends
Figure 3.2: Dividends by Standard Industrial Classication (SIC)
sector and SIC dividends relative to total dividends, that is, the
dividends of one sector divided by total dividends (CRSP data from
1973 to 2009)
3.3. DIVIDEND MODEL 3-15
payers4 distributed, on average, 78% of all dividends. This percent-
age varied between 71% and 85%, reaching its lowest in 1979 and
peaking in 2001. These gures show that dividend payment is enor-
mously concentrated among a few rms and that this concentration
trended upward over time.
This section has noted several patterns relating to company num-
bers and dividend payment. To reect these patterns, a long-run div-
idend model should exhibit the following features: a dynamic number
of companies, wave-like changes in the number of companies, some
large jumps in dividends, concentration of dividend payments among
a small fraction of rms, and the capacity to accommodate shifts of
dividends between dierent sectors.
3.3 Dividend model
This section will present a dividend model that is based on the styl-
ized facts established in the previous section. Within this model,
rms can be born and default, and a few large corporations issue a
large percentage of dividend payments. In other words, small, young
rms (startups) pay only a small dividend and are at high risk of
defaulting, but have opportunities to grow into concerns, which pay
large dividends. To provide more detail, this model assumes an econ-
omy that consists of three types of companies: IPOs, startups, and
concerns. IPOs are rms that have newly entered the market. In
the entering period, investors pay a certain amount for an IPO and
4The top 5% of dividend payers constitute 5% of the companies paying the
highest total dividends.
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do not receive a dividend, and in the second period, the IPO auto-
matically becomes a startup. Startups pay low dividends and may
grow into concerns, which are mature rms that spend large sums on
dividends but cannot grow further. These characteristics reect the
empirical evidence produced by Hall (1987), Evans (1987a,b), and
Dhawan (2001), which demonstrates that younger rms have higher
growth rates than older rms. Both types of companies can default
and a company may change types in any period (a dead company
being one such type). That is to say, a startup can default, remain
a startup, or become a concern, and a concern can either default
or remain a concern. A company that has defaulted is dead forever.
The transition probabilities in Figure 3.3 are given as follows: pSD is
the probability that a startup will default during a period and pSS is
the probability that the startup will remain a startup. If the startup
survives, then pSD is the probability that it will default during the
next period. The probability that a startup becomes a concern is
then given by pSC = 1   pSS   pSD. A concern may remain a con-
cern or default, and the probabilities for these events are pCC and
pCD = 1  pCC .
Type changes are independent between companies and over time.
If pSD and pCD are strictly positive, every company will default at
one point in time, that is, if t!1 the probability that a company
is defaulted converges to 1. To guarantee that some companies will
always exist, the number of IPOs in every period, nnew, exceeds zero.
The number of startups, concerns, and IPOs are represented by nSt ,
nCt , and nnew, respectively. The long-run averages of the number of
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Figure 3.3: Development of a company over time. An IPO becomes
a startup, a startup can become a concern or disappear after several
periods, and a concern will exist for several periods and then disap-
pear. The probability of each event is presented beside the arrows.
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startups and concerns can be calculated as follows:
E
 
nS

=
nnew
1  pSS and E
 
nC

=
pSC  nnew
(1  pSS)(1  pSC) : (3.1)
Every year, every startup pays a xed strictly positive dividend DS ,
and each concern pays a xed dividend DC > DS . The xed divi-
dend DS remains constant from the foundation of a startup to the
point where it either becomes a concern or dies. Should it become
a concern, the dividend of the new concern experiences a huge up-
ward jump; should it die, however, DS permanently falls to zero.
A concern pays DC every year until it is dissolved. Therefore, the
sum of all dividends paid by startups in a single period is the result
of nSt D
S and the total of all dividends paid by concerns during the
same period is nCt D
C . Since IPOs do not pay dividends, it follows
that the total dividend paid out in period t is the sum of the divi-
dends paid by the startups and the concerns. The general structure
of this dividend model is not completely new. Hurley and Johnson
(1994) used a similar trinomial model to price individual stocks.
This model incorporates most of the features mentioned at the
end of Section 3.2. The number of companies is dynamic and under-
goes wave-like changes. Dividend payments can be parameterized so
that they are largely paid by concerns and only fractionally disbursed
by startups and are therefore concentrated among the concerns. To
ensure that the simulation problem in Section 3.6 is tractable, the
number of IPOs in every period is set to one. Simulations show
that, with this assumption, the number of startups and concerns
is changing drastically over time. Adding waves in the number of
IPOs, as observed in the data of Section 3.2, would strengthen this
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Startup Concern Miscellaneous
DS 1 DC 40.1 nnew 1
pSD 2.3% pCD 0.6% 0 5%
pSS 97.0% pCC 99.4%
pSC 0.7%
Table 3.3: Simulation parameters calibrated on CRSP data
eect further. Mergers are not included in the model because they
do not matter, assuming that the dividends and portfolio weights of
the new rm are the sum of the merging companies. Owing to the
fact that new companies enter the market at all the times and ex-
isting companies disappear in the long run, changes in the dividends
between several sectors can be explained by the model: in a cer-
tain time frame, mainly textile rms could enter the market, while
in another period, only IT rms, and so on. That is, the sector of
rms entering the market changes over time. After a certain period,
the IPOs become concerns and pay considerable dividends, thereby
leading to an increase in the importance of the sector. If no new
rm of a certain sector enters the market, the sector disappears in
the long run. As a whole, the model is very simple, but it includes
many elements that are important in the long-run dividend process.
This paper aims to simulate the wealth shares of dierent invest-
ment strategies. For this, dividends must also be simulated. Ta-
ble 3.3 shows the parameters of the dividend process. These are
calibrated with CRSP data for the years 1973 to 2009 in order to
correlate the dividend process with the stylized facts underlying the
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dividend model. Table 3.2 does not conrm whether companies that
were dropped from their exchanges were delisted owing to nancial
problems. Because of that uncertainty, the decision regarding which
type a company belongs to is based on market capitalization: a com-
pany that has belonged to the top decile of all companies for at least
two years is classied as a concern from that point until it defaults.
Companies that neither qualied as concerns nor belonged to the
lowest decile for at least two years in a row are classied as startups.
A startup defaults if its value remains in the lowest decile for the
rest of its life, whereas a concern defaults if its value remains below
the largest 30% of all active companies for the rest of its life. The
default threshold for concerns may seem high, but the market value
of a concern dened as dead is approximately ve times lower than
the market value at which a startup becomes a concern. In other
words, this threshold ensures that a concern must have suered sub-
stantial losses before it defaults. The dividends of a startup, DS , is
normalized to one. The concern dividends, DC , are determined in
two steps. First, the quotient obtained by dividing every year the
average of concern dividends through the average of startup divi-
dends. This results in the dividends of the concerns in every year
(DS is normed to 1). Given that, the dividend of the concern is the
average over all the years from which this quotient is derived. This
dividend process is unrealistic for two reasons: rst, it does not con-
sider mergers, and second, it assigns equal dividend amounts to all
company types. However, these simplications allow us to observe
the eects of the creation, growth, and default of rms on the wealth
of investment strategies, which is the main purpose of this model.
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3.4 Market selection model
As stated in the previous section, the dividend model is based on ex-
ogenously given dividends. In the next step of the dividend process,
the companies generating these dividends are traded in a market and
their shares may be purchased by several investors. This section will
describe how the wealth of diering investment strategies and with
that the asset returns evolve over time.
The state of nature in t is !(t) and is described by the divi-
dend payment of all companies at t. Therefore, the history of states
equals !t = (!(0); : : : ; !(t)). Given this, the percentage of wealth
consumed by investment strategy i, at t in an economy with I in-
vestment strategies is dened as i0;t (!
t), where i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig. This
percentage is assumed to be constant over time and identical for all
strategies because this paper focuses on comparing the performance
of investment strategies, rather than analyzing the inuence of the
savings rate. Further, this assumption allows us to simplify i0;t (!
t)
to 0, which is important because it eliminates the possibility that
an irrational strategy will survive by having a higher savings rate
than rational strategies. In such a case, the rational strategy has a
higher return, but the irrational strategy achieves a higher growth
rate through a higher savings ratio and thereby marginalizing the ra-
tional strategy in the long run (see, e.g., Blume and Easley (1992)).
The percentage of wealth invested by shareholder i in company
k at time t is represented by ik;t (!
t). Nonexistent companies must
have portfolio weights of zero; therefore, ik;t (!
t) = 0 for all compa-
nies that do not exist at t. Every strategy can invest in any existing
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company, but short selling is not allowed; that is, 0  ik;t (!t)  1.
This budget constraint implies that
P
k 
i
k;t (!
t) = 1. Note that the
sum over k can be interpreted as the sum over all past, actual, and
future companies. However, it is not possible to invest in nonexistent
companies, so this equates to adding up only the investments made
in companies existing in period t. The wealth of investor i in t is wit
and the price of asset k in t is qk;t. Therefore, the number of shares
held by investor i in company k at time t is
ik;t =
(
ik;t(!
t)wit
qk;t
if company k exists in t
0 otherwise:
(3.2)
If the number of stocks issued by a company is normalized to one
and if all stocks need to be held by someone, the price of one stock
in company k at t, or the market capitalization of that company, can
be given as follows:
qk;t =
IX
i=1
ik;t
 
!t

wit =: k;t
 
!t

wt (3.3)
where wt is a column vector including the wealth of all investors in
period t and k;t (!
t) is a row vector with the portfolio weights of all
investors in asset k during period t. The asset prices can be written
in matrix notation as follows:
qt = t
 
!t

wt; (3.4)
where qt is a price vector including all companies and t (!
t) is a
matrix of all portfolio weights of period t. The number of rows rep-
resents the number of assets, and the number of columns represents
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the number of investors. Finally, the vector wt includes the wealth
of every investor in t. The wealth of an investor in t+ 1 is equal to
the value of his portfolio plus the dividend payment:
wit+1 =
X
k
 
Dkt+1
 
!t+1

+ qk;t+1

ik;t: (3.5)
The dividends of asset k at t + 1 are represented by Dkt+1
 
!t+1

.
Note that qk;t+1 and 
i
k;t depend on wt and k;t (!
t). The next
step is to express the wealth dynamic in terms of exogenously given
variables as the dividends and the strategy that depends only on the
state of the world, !t. The preceding equation can be expressed in
matrix notation as follows:
wt+1 =
X
k
 
Dkt+1
 
!t+1

+ qk;t+1

k;t; (3.6)
= tDt+1
 
!t+1

+tqt+1; (3.7)
= tDt+1
 
!t+1

+tt+1
 
!t+1

wt+1; (3.8)
where the last equation follows from equation (3.4). The number
of shares held by all investors in all companies, k;t, is a column
vector with the length of the number of investors and t combines
the vectors k;t into a matrix in which the number of investors is
designated by the number of rows and the number of assets by the
number of columns. Furthermore,Dt+1
 
!t+1

is the vector denoting
the dividends of all assets in t+1, given the state !t+1. Writing wt+1
on one side of the equation results in 
I tt+1
 
!t+1

wt+1 = tDt+1
 
!t+1

: (3.9)
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The evolution of wealth is therefore
wt+1 =
 
I tt+1
 
!t+1
 1
tDt+1
 
!t+1

: (3.10)
The next step is to check whether the wealth of all investors in t +
1, wt+1, and the stock prices during the same period, qt+1, are
always nonnegative. This is important because negative asset prices
make no economic sense and negative wealth presents the problem of
whether the investor will be able to pay back his or her debts. The
system can be considered well-dened if the wealth of all investors
and prices of all assets are nonnegative during all t. This requires
three assumptions:
Assumption 1. Consumption takes place and does not violate the
rule that 0 < i0;t (!
t) < 1 for all i, t, and !t.
Assumption 2. At least one completely diversied portfolio rule is
in force: an i exists such that ik;t (!
t) > 0 for all existing k, t, and
!t.
Assumption 3. If a company, k, is dead or not yet founded at t,
then nobody invests in it (i.e., ik;t (!
t) = 0).
Proposition 1. Suppose that w0 > 0 and assumptions 1 to 3 are
satised. Then, the evolution of wealth (3.10) is well dened in all
t <1.
Mainly, the proposition holds because this setup is constructed
so that both t and t (!
t) contain many zeros; consequently, the
step from t to t+ 1 is only inuenced by companies existing in both
periods. Considering this, the proof for Proposition 1 is analogous
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to that supplied by Evstigneev et al. (2006). Since the chief eect of
Proposition 1 is to enable proper model simulation, the restriction
to a nite number of time periods is not problematic.
The model may appear very similar to that of Evstigneev et al.
(2006) or Amir et al. (2009a), but it is not possible to show that the
generalized Kelly rule is locally evolutionary stable5 or is a (unique)
surviving strategy. A main prerequisite of their result is that con-
sumption is a constant share of total wealth. In the present setup,
shareholders pay a certain amount of money to establish a newly
founded IPO, and this amount depends on the investment strategies
of the investors and is therefore typically not constant over time.
This fraction of investor wealth leaves the economy and is hence also
a form of consumption, but because it is not constant over time, it is
not possible to conrm the existence of principles such as local evo-
lutionary stability or a unique surviving strategy. Results on these
subjects are therefore provided by simulations. However, before this,
the strategies to be considered for simulations must be dened.
3.5 Strategies
This paper has thus far delineated a dividend model and an evo-
lutionary market selection model and will now proceed to discuss
investor strategies, which must be known in order to simulate the
entire market. Which strategies should compete in this model? A
5A strategy that drives every other strategy out of the market if the initial
wealth of the other strategy is small enough is considered locally evolutionary
stable.
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good starting point may be a generalized version of the Kelly rule:
k;t =
0
1  0
1X
m=1
(1  0)m E
 
dk;t+m(!
t+m) j !t ;
where dk;t are the relative dividends of asset k at t (i.e., dk;t =
DktP
iD
i
t
). The strategy  has a probability of one of resulting in a
positive wealth share when applied to both short (one-period) and in-
nitely long-lived assets see Amir et al. (2009a,b). However, neither
this nor other results from literature dealing with local and evolu-
tionary stability apply to the strategy  in a market wherein new
companies can be established or rms can default. Furthermore, the
strategy is not directly applicable in the setup of this paper. This is
because new companies will enter the market in future periods and
will, therefore, pay positive relative dividends. These assets are not
included in the calculation of , which must therefore not sum up to
one. This issue can be circumvented by including only those compa-
nies that existed during t in the calculation of the relative dividends
in the formula for k;t. From a practical point of view, the lack of a
closed-form solution for calculating  is a more problematic issue.
The strategy could be estimated via simulation, but doing so over
an innite time horizon would be time consuming and/or imprecise.
Moreover, the evolutionary setup requires that this calculation be
performed thousands of times, which was not practicable. Portfolio
weights proportional to the NPV of the companies dividends pro-
vided a close substitute. The NPV of asset k with discount factor
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1  0 is dened by
NPVk =
1X
m=1
(1  0)m E
 
Dk;t+m(!
t+m) j !t :
The NPVs of the dividends of the dierent types of companies are
as follows:
NPVconcern =
(1  0) pCCDC
1  (1  0) pCC
NPVstartup = (1  0)
pSSD
S + pSC
 
DC +NPVconcern

1  (1  0) pSS
NPVIPO = (1  0)
 
NPVstartup+D
S

:
If NPVk;t is dened as the NPV of asset k in period t, then the
strategy based on the relative NPVs is as follows:
1k;t
 
!t

=
NPVk;tP
j NPVj;t
:
To nd out whether the NPV strategy approximates the generalized
Kelly rule, the portfolio weights of both strategies were calculated
for several parameterizations and then compared. To determine the
portfolio weights of the Kelly rule, the relative dividends of the com-
panies were simulated 1,000 periods ahead, and the Kelly strategy
was calculated using these dividends. This process was repeated
10,000 times. The average of these 10,000 realizations gives . This
result not only shows that the formula for the NPV is similar to the
formula for . In fact, the NPV strategy and the generalized Kelly
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rule are equivalent if total dividends in the economy are constant
over time. The rest of the paper mainly uses one standard parame-
terization, which can be found in Table 3.3. The parameters of the
standard parameterization are varied in Table 3.4, and the dierence
between the allocation of the Kelly rule, , and the NPV-strategy,
1 of these variations are presented in Panels A to D.
6 The total
share of wealth invested in concerns, startups, and IPOs is calcu-
lated, and the percentage dierence between the generalized Kelly
rule and the NPV strategy is shown in Table 3.4. In most cases, the
dierence is well below 0.5%, which shows that the results produced
by the two strategies are close to being identical. However, the dier-
ences between the two strategies widen massively when the default
probability for concerns achieves 5% or more; overall, a generalized
Kelly rule investor would invest almost 4% more in concerns than an
NPV investor would under such circumstances. This indicates that
dierences exist between these two types of investors. Since the typ-
ical default probability for concerns is 1% or smaller, this dierence
has no impact on the simulations performed in the rest of this pa-
per, wherein the NPV strategy is used as a proxy for the generalized
Kelly rule because it can be calculated much faster than the latter
can.
The previous strategy is called the theoretical NPV strategy since
the parameters are assumed to be known. But in reality, the true
parameters of the dividend model are unknown. Therefore, these
parameters are estimated on the basis of past (simulated) data in
order to compare this model with other models. DC and DS can be
6The parameters DS , pSS = 1   pSC   pSD and pCC = 1   pCD are not
varied either because they are normed to one or given by the other parameters.
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Panel A: Varying DC
DC 2 10 50 100
IPO: IPO   1IPO 0.021% -0.001% 0.001% -0.003%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.156% 0.102% 0.165% 0.205%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.177% -0.101% -0.166% -0.202%
Panel B: Varying pSC
pSC 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO 0.031% -0.006% -0.004% 0.000%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.304% 0.258% 0.198% 0.214%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.336% -0.252% -0.194% -0.215%
Panel C: Varying pSD
pSD 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO -0.010% -0.013% -0.001% -0.005%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.100% 0.105% 0.120% 0.174%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.090% -0.091% -0.120% -0.169%
Panel D: Varying pCD
pCD 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO -0.144% -0.120% -0.019% -0.009%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S -3.585% -3.637% -0.430% 0.137%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C 3.728% 3.757% 0.449% -0.127%
Table 3.4: Percentage dierence between the Kelly rule, , and the
NPV strategy, 1, in terms of total investment in IPOs, startups,
and concerns. The parameters of the dividend process can be found
in Table 3.3. In each panel, one parameter is varied. The strategies
are calculated on the assumption that the number of IPOs, startups,
and concerns is equal to their long-run averages of 1, E
 
nS

and
E
 
nC

. The generalized Kelly rule, , is obtained through 10,000
simulations over 1,000 time periods.
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directly observed from the data, thereby making probability estima-
tion quite simple. For example, pCD can be estimated by dividing
the number of defaults of concerns by the sum of the active concern
years of all the concerns plus the number of defaults. This estimator
is also a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). With the estimated
parameters, the competing strategy 2k;t (!
t) can be calculated in the
same way as 1k;t (!
t), and it is called the empirical NPV strategy.
The next step is to nd some interesting alternative strategies.
Hens et al. (2002) and Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2004) applied a
simple strategy; they used average relative dividends as a proxy for
. In the case of i.i.d. dividends, this is the Kelly rule. Therefore
this strategy is
3k;t
 
!t

=
c3
 + 1
X
i=0
Dkt i
 
!t i
P
j D
j
t i (!t i)
:=
c3
 + 1
X
i=0
dkt i(!
t i):
The number of periods over which averaging has been conducted is
represented by  and the factor c3 is chosen such that
PK
k=0 
3
k;t (!
t) =
1. This constant is needed because the environment of the existing
companies diers in every time period and it is therefore not a given
that the full budget of the agents is used after the averaging. This
paper uses this strategy with the  values of 100, 20, and 0. Consid-
ering a long history to estimate the relative dividends is eective in
the case of i.i.d. relative dividends. In that case, the strategy con-
verges to . This is not the case in the selected dividend model,
but this strategy is still an important benchmark. The case of  = 0
is special in that it relies only on the current relative dividends.
Therefore, this strategy is the called current relative dividend strat-
egy. Since it relies only on an extremely short history, it may be in
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a strong position in a setup where not much can be learnt from the
past dividend history.
The last strategy diversies naively; it invests the same amount
into all existing assets. In other words,
5k;t
 
!t

=
1
Total number of active companies in t
:
This strategy may appear somewhat unsophisticated, but DeMiguel
et al. (2009) have showed that it performs astonishingly well on real
data.
Obviously, many more strategies are possible. However, the gen-
eralized Kelly rule performs best in simulations within the i.i.d. and
stationary setting, whereas mean-variance, adaptive, and even more
sophisticated strategies have no chance of surviving (see Hens et al.
(2002), Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2004), and Tupak (2009)). There-
fore, it makes sense to examine mainly those strategies on the basis
of relative dividends, such as the generalized Kelly rule. To ensure
that this inference holds, Section 3.6.3 compares the NPV strategy
with a large number of xed-mix strategies and conrms that the
NPV strategy is not only a surviving strategy but, perhaps, also a
locally evolutionary stable strategy.
3.6 Simulations
The main purpose of this section is to simulate the wealth dynamic
of the competing investment strategies described above within the
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dividend process detailed herein. This will be done using equation
(3.10). First, a simple example demonstrates the errors that can be
produced by choosing an inadequate strategy by wrongly assuming a
stationary dividend process. Second, simulations show that the NPV
strategy is indeed able to take over a large part of the market, and
nally, some robustness checks are performed on the NPV strategy.
3.6.1 An illustrative example
With i.i.d. relative dividends, the Kelly rule  is equal to the average
past relative dividends, 3. This subsection shows that 3 is unable
to dominate the market under the dividend model of this paper with
nonstationary dividends and nitely lived assets, and it fails against
the naive strategy of investing the same amount into each asset, 5.
In contrast to our paper, most of the literature assumes i.i.d. divi-
dends with innitely lived assets for their simulations (see, e.g., Hens
et al. (2002), Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2004), or Tupak (2009)); this
questions the relevance of these results. The dividend process is
parameterized according to Table 3.3. To emphasize the results of
this section, pSC was set at 0.15 (as a consequence, pSS = 0:827).
This example establishes that a naive strategy that invests an equal
share of wealth in every company can accumulate more wealth than
a strategy based on the average relative dividends of the previous
20 periods (see Figure 3.4). The two strategies begin with equal
wealth, and after 1,000 periods averaged out over 1,000 simulations,
the naive 1=n-strategy claims 58:5% of the total wealth, whereas the
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Figure 3.4: Relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals out
of 1,000 simulations over 1,000 time periods. The market comprises
two strategies: the historical relative dividend strategy averaged over
the previous 20 time periods and the naive strategy. All strategies
begin with equal wealth.
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historical relative dividend strategy accounts for 41:5%.78 This re-
sult follows from the high probability that a startup will become a
concern, which the relative dividend investor, who invests accord-
ing to the past average relative dividends, neither knows nor takes
into account because the event is observed once in the life of a rm.
In contrast, the 1=n-strategy increases its wealth share by invest-
ing more funds in startups than the relative dividend strategy does.
Therefore, both strategies will survive in the long run. However,
parameterizations calibrated on CRSP data show that the success
of the nave investor in the real world falls far short of the outcome
achieved in this example. The simulated parameters in Table 3.3 put
the real-world probability of a startup becoming a concern at a mere
0.7% (not 15%). This parameter results in an average wealth share
of just 6.2% for the 1=n-strategy after 1,000 periods. The simulations
wherein pSC = 0:15 are an example of how an optimal strategy may
completely fail if a wrong dividend process is assumed. Therefore,
it is extremely important for evolutionary simulations to assume a
correctly specied dividend process.
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Figure 3.5: Relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals out of
1,000 simulations over 10,000 time periods. The market comprises
four strategies: the theoretical NPV strategy, the current relative
dividends strategy, the historical relative dividend strategy averaged
over the previous 20 time periods, and the naive strategy. All strate-
gies begin with equal wealth.
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3.6.2 Is the NPV strategy able to take over the
market?
The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that an NPV
strategy will nally take over almost the entire market. To achieve
this objective, the parameters given in Table 3.3 were used to simu-
late changes in the wealth shares of the NPV, current relative divi-
dend, historical relative dividend, and naive strategies. This involved
estimating the mean and 95% condence intervals of the relative
wealth of the competing strategies on the basis of 1,000 simulations
(see Figure 3.5). The results conrm that the theoretical NPV strat-
egy outperforms all the other strategies to a striking extent. How-
ever, the strategies converge very slowly compared to those used
by Hens et al. (2002) and Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2004), who use
i.i.d. dividend processes. In particular, the current relative dividend
strategy loses wealth shares so slowly that after 1,000 periods, it still
commands a larger market share than the NPV strategy does. Given
that the model was calibrated so that one period equates to one year,
this implies that evolutionary convergence can require an extremely
long time horizon, especially if the competing strategies are not very
dissimilar from the optimal one.
As mentioned earlier, a locally evolutionary stable strategy pre-
7Increasing the number of time periods to 5,000 (the default number of time
periods in the rest of the paper) does not have a signicant impact on the result.
8The simulations of the whole paper were also done with 100 simulations.
The impact on average wealth, the main variable of interest, is minor. The only
visible dierence was that the condence bands became smoother with 1,000
simulations. An even higher number of simulations is therefore unlikely to alter
the results.
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vents invading strategies from earning higher returns when it has
almost all the wealth in a market. Is the theoretical NPV strategy a
locally evolutionary stable strategy? This question is easily answered
via simulation. The process involves assuming that the theoretical
NPV strategy begins with 97% of total wealth and that the three
other strategies each start o with 1% of total wealth. On the ba-
sis of this assumption, 5,000 time periods are then simulated 1,000
times in order to determine whether the theoretical NPV strategy
is able to retain its wealth share. The results of this procedure re-
veal that, after 5,000 periods, the theoretical NPV strategy owns
an average of 97.7% of total wealth, with a standard deviation of
0.9%. In contrast, the current relative dividend strategy accrues an
average of 1.3% of total wealth with a standard deviation of 0.6%.
The simulated distribution of the latters increase in wealth shows
that it is not statistically signicant at the 5% level. In other words,
strategies with small total wealth shares are not able to wrest mar-
ket share away from the theoretical NPV strategy. Therefore, the
theoretical NPV strategy is evolutionary stable, at least against the
chosen alternative strategies.
The wealth shares of the NPV strategy should also be determined
using dividend parameters that are estimated from simulated divi-
dend data, that is, the empirical NPV strategy. To this end, the
parameters of the dividend process must be estimated over a su-
cient number of time periods to ensure that the parameter values are
precise enough. For example, if the parameters for calculating the
empirical NPV strategy are determined on the basis of the previous
20 periods at every point of time, then the empirical strategy would
be vanquished by the current relative dividend strategy. Starting
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Figure 3.6: The relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals
of 1,000 simulations of 5,000 time periods. The market comprises
four strategies: the empirical NPV strategy, the current relative div-
idends strategy, the historical relative dividend strategy averaged
over 100 periods, and the nave strategy. All strategies start with
equal wealth.
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with 97% of total wealth, the wealth share of the empirical NPV
strategy would fall to an average of 57.0% of total wealth after 5,000
periods simulated 1,000 times each. Conversely, the wealth share
of the current relative dividends strategy would expand from 1% to
28.5% of total wealth, and the historical relative dividends strat-
egy and the naive strategy would gain 5.3% and 7.2% of additional
wealth share, respectively. Figure 3.6 depicts the results of simu-
lations using parameters obtained on the basis of the previous 100
periods. Both the empirical NPV and historical relative dividend
strategies are now determined over the previous 100 periods so that
the learning horizon remains consistent between them. In the same
setup, the empirical NPV strategy acquires 98.0% of total wealth af-
ter 5,000 periods. All other strategies lose in wealth share aside from
the relative dividend strategy, whose wealth share grows fractionally
from 1% to 1.1%. In contrast to the results generated by parameters
estimated from the previous 20 periods, these results show that the
empirical NPV strategy easily conquers the other strategies when
parameters calculated from the previous 100 periods are used. How-
ever, the empirical NPV strategy converges at a slower pace than
it does in the simulations for the theoretical NPV strategy. This
leads to the conclusion that, by denition, an imprecise estimation
of the correct parameters aects the performance of the empirical
NPV strategy, in some cases so much that the empirical NPV strat-
egy has no chance to survive. This concurs with Tupak (2009), who
nds that other strategies can perform better than  if the latter
must be learnt from the data. For innitely lived assets and strate-
gies that depend only on the state of the world, Theorem 2 of Amir
et al. (2009a) implies that the optimal strategy learnt from the data
must not survive against the optimal strategy that knows the true
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model parameters, that is, other strategies may triumph over the es-
timated optimal strategy. The simulations by DeMiguel et al. (2009)
showed that thousands of monthly observations are required before
an optimal mean-variance strategy featuring asset returns that pos-
sess a multivariate normal distribution can overcome the naive 1=n
strategy. This is mainly because the estimated average returns of the
strategies contain a high level of error. Thus, the implementation of
the theoretical optimal strategy may remain a challenge because of
the errors in the estimation of the dividend process.
3.6.3 Robustness Checks
Obviously, the set of strategies in the market can greatly inuence
the outcome; therefore, the NPV strategy should be tested against as
many other strategies as practicable in order to conrm the ndings
presented above. This was accomplished by further running the the-
oretical NPV strategy against a wide range of xed-mix strategies.
The fraction of funds invested in IPOs was assumed constant at 0.2%
of total investment, which is the rounded average value of the NPV
strategy if the number of companies is given by the long-run average
dened in equation (3.1). Total investment in concerns was varied
between 0% and 99.8% of total investment and was calculated using
quantities that diered by 0.1% from each other. This investment
was equally divided between all concerns and the rest of the invest-
ment was equally divided between all startups. This resulted in the
creation of 998 dierent xed-mix strategies to compete with the
NPV strategies in the market. The theoretical NPV strategy started
with 97% of total wealth with the rest divided equally among the
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Figure 3.7: The full line indicates the wealth share of xed-mix
strategies investing a constant share of wealth into concerns as av-
eraged over 1,000 simulations. The dotted lines represent the 95%
condence interval of the strategies. The percentage of investment
in concerns is shown on the x-axis. The percentage of investment in
IPOs holds steady at 0.2% of the total investment and the remainder
is invested in startups. The dashed line represents the initial wealth
share.
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xed-mix strategies.9 Figure 3.6.3 shows the average wealth share of
the various xed-mix strategies after 5,000 periods simulated 1,000
times each. The dashed line represents the average wealth share of
these strategies in the rst period. Fixed-mix strategies that invested
less than 90.8% into concerns lose in average market share, while
other xed-mix strategies gain. Overall, the NPV strategy is able
to increase its wealth share and ends up with 99.3% of total wealth.
Naturally, the gains of the xed-mix strategies that invested heavily
in concerns are obtained at the expense of the xed-mix strategies
that invested limited amounts in concerns. To compare the successful
xed-mix strategies with the NPV strategies, all xed-mix strategies
that had gained in average wealth shares (i.e., those that invested
90.8% or more of their total wealth in concerns) were then matched
against the NPV strategy. As before, all strategies involved were
simulated 1,000 times per period over 5,000 periods. After 5,000 pe-
riods, the NPV strategy amasses a wealth share of 96.9%. The 95%
condence band rises from 93.9% to 98.6%, indicating that the ini-
tial wealth of the strategy does not dier statistically from the nal
wealth. In contrast, none of the xed-mix strategies with a 95% con-
dence interval are able to gain a statistically signicant proportion
of wealth shares and their wins or losses more or less amount to zero
(see Figure 3.7(b)). Overall, no xed-mix strategy is able to push
the NPV strategy out of the market. On the other hand, the NPV
strategy is also unable to push the xed-mix strategies completely
out of the market (although the wealth share of the latter is small).
9This percentage was chosen to make the setup comparable with that delin-
eated in Section 3.6.2. With an initial wealth of 90% of the theoretical NPV
strategies, the results are comparable and the theoretical NPV strategy gains
massively in wealth shares.
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This evinces that the NPV strategy is a very close approximation to
the real dominant strategy but is not itself the dominant strategy
(given that such a strategy exists at all).
The results obtained in the previous section may dier according
to variations in model parameters. Therefore, I ran additional tests
in order to evaluate the main hypothesis that the NPV strategy is
locally evolutionary stable compared with the current relative div-
idend, historical relative dividend, and naive investment strategies.
This was done by estimating the aforementioned strategies with sev-
eral dierent sets of parameterizations and examining the stability
of the results thereby obtained. The NPV strategy was simulated
with parameters calculated from the previous 100 periods and an ini-
tial wealth share of 97% and allocated the other strategies 1% each
of wealth share. The results show increases in the wealth share of
the empirical NPV strategy averaged out over 1,000 simulations over
5,000 time periods (see Table 3.5) and shows that this strategy can
increase its relative weight under dierent parameterizations. This
suggests that the NPV strategy can survive the evolutionary time-
line with a large share of wealth and may therefore be at least close
to a locally evolutionary stable strategy.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that large dividend jumps and the creation,
growth, and default of companies are very important aspects of the
dividend process. The idealized model presented herein shows that
these factors have considerable inuence on the performance of dier-
3-44 ARTICLE 3. MARKET SELECTION MODEL
Emp. Current Historical Naive
NPV rel. div. rel. div. investor
Initial relative wealth 0.970 0.010 0.010 0.010
Benchmark 0.980 0.011 0.000 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
0 = 10% 0.982 0.012 0.000 0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
dC = 10 0.975 0.013 0.002 0.010
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
dC = 100 0.984 0.009 0.000 0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
nnew = 5 0.978 0.012 0.002 0.008
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
pCC = 98% 0.977 0.017 0.000 0.006
pCD = 2% (0.008) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006)
pSC = 2:0% 0.972 0.013 0.006 0.009
pSS = 95:7% (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pSD = 5:0% 0.973 0.015 0.000 0.011
pSS = 92:3% (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
Table 3.5: The average relative wealth shares of the four main strate-
gies after 1,000 simulations of 5,000 periods. The gures in paren-
theses express the standard deviations of the given percentages. The
market comprises four investors: the empirical NPV investor (learn-
ing over 100 periods), the current relative dividends investor, the
historical relative dividend investor averaging over 100 time periods,
and the naive investor. Eight models were estimated: the benchmark
model, which was calculated according to the parameterizations in
Table 3.3, and seven other models wherein one parameter has been
dierent compared to the benchmark model. The varied parameter
and its new value can be found in the leftmost column.
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ent investment strategies and signies the inadequacy of considering
only the time series of any given company in determining the per-
centage of wealth that should be invested into that company. Rather,
these ndings suggest that comparable companies should be studied
in order to determine the optimal portfolio weight of companies. This
is a new idea that complicates many aspects of evolutionary nance,
including the estimation of an appropriate dividend model, and con-
stitutes an important drawback: even very primitive strategies can
outperform the most elaborate ones if a huge amount of data is re-
quired to estimate them accurately. Nevertheless, the NPV strategy,
a close substitute of the generalized Kelly rule, dominates within this
setup, although it requires long time periods to approximate a 100%
wealth share. Alternatively, this result could also indicate that the
strategy that is able to achieve the most precise calculations of the
fundamental value of a rms dividends will be the one to survive or
even dominate the market in the long run.
Simulation studies, such as this one, inherently face one major
issue: it is never possible to test the whole range of possible param-
eters. Therefore, even with the extensive robustness checks carried
out within the paper, there is no guarantee that the results found
can be generalized for all cases. Furthermore, the Kelly strategy does
not generalize to the chosen setup and must be approximated by the
NPV strategy. Therefore, the present paper provides only a rough
approximation of an evolutionary stable strategy.
This study generates three interesting directions for future re-
search. First, theoretical results pertaining to nonstationary divi-
dends and nitely lived rms would ascertain whether the results
provided by simulations in this paper are generally applicable. Sec-
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ond, future work could perform simulations on the basis of alter-
native stochastic dividend processes in order to investigate the im-
pact of such processes on the surviving strategy. Third, this paper
has shown that the learning period may wield a crucial inuence on
strategy performance. Therefore, future work could attempt to de-
termine how the dividend process should be learned optimally, such
that the optimal strategy based on those results is able to take over
the market.
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